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BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC 
POLICY AND FREE TRADE 
Diane A. Desierto* 
I think we need to start a discussion about the future — a future 
which honors the aims of the Marrakesh Agreement, which is 
worthy of our role in international relations, trade and develop-
ment, and which delivers for the people we are here to serve — 
particularly the poorest. It is time to face up to the undeniable 
problems we have in this organization and have an open and 
honest discussion about how we can move forward. 
                                   WTO Director-General Roberto Azevedo1 
INTRODUCTION:  AN ‘EITHER-OR’ DILEMMA AT THE WTO? 
In the wake of the impasse between the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) and India regarding the ratification of the 
Protocol to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) that con-
cluded during the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, 
Indonesia on December of 2013, WTO Director-General Roberto 
Azevedo admitted that while the WTO succeeds in resolving 
trade disputes and monitoring trade practices, it  “has failed to 
                                                          
 
Paper prepared for Korea Society of International Economic Law 
(KSIEL) International Conference on “Trade and Global Governance: A Pano-
ramic View of Free Trade Agreements and the WTO,” November 6-7, 2014, 
Novotel Ambassador Gangnam, Seoul, Korea (This paper draws from insights 
in this author’s forthcoming book, DIANE A. DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:  THE ICESCR IN TRADE, FINANCE, AND 
INVESTMENT (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter “DESIERTO 2015”]). 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hawaii William S. Richardson 
School of Law; Co-Director, ASEAN Law & Integration Center (ALIC); Ad-
junct Fellow, East-West Center, USA; Partner, DAPD Law (Philippines). 
Yale Law School JSD (2011), LLM (2009); University of the Philippines 
LLB/now JD (2004) cum laude salutatorian, BSc Economics (2000) summa 
cum laude valedictorian. I may be reached at dsierto@hawaii.edu, 
desiertd@EastWestCenter.org, dianedesierto@aya.yale.edu. 
1
 WTO Director-General’s Statement at the Trade Negotiations Commit-
tee Formal Meeting, Oct. 16, 2014, available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/tnc_stat_16oct14_e.htm.  
1
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deliver new multilateral results since its creation.”2 This sys-
temic failure in the trade negotiations pillar of the WTO is evi-
dent to all of its 160 Members.  It is evident from thirteen years 
of stalled negotiations under the Doha Round;3 the inability of 
the WTO to encourage agreements between developing and de-
veloped countries on the Doha Development Agenda;4 the con-
temporaneous proliferation of around 585 regional trade 
agreements (RTAs)5 which, at best, have not facilitated any ap-
parent global agreement under the Doha Round;6 and (more re-
cently) India’s demand for permanent changes to WTO rules to 
avoid sanctioning developing countries’ food security policies.7  
While many WTO Members have publicly criticized India for 
unfairly holding the TFA hostage,8 other powerful Green Room9 
                                                          
2
 Speech by WTO Director-General Roberto Azevedo, Canada, Oct. 9, 
2014, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra36_e.htm. 
3
 See Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Nego-
tiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J.  573, 577-82 (2010). 
4
 Id. 
5
 As of June 15, 2014, the 585 notifications of RTAs (separately counting 
goods, services and accessions), with 379 in force, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last accessed 
Mar. 10, 2015).  
6
 See Colin B. Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. The WTO:  A Pro-
posal for the Reform of Article XXIV to Counter this Institutional Threat, 26 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 2 (2005), 267-319; Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen, 
and Christian Volpe Martincus, Regional Trade Agreements:  Development 
Challenges and Policy Options, Inter-American Development Bank, 1, 17-18? 
(Nov. 2012), available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/11955 
.pdf. 
7
 See J.P. Singh, India’s multi-faceted WTO refusal, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 
2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/08/05/indias-multi-faceted-wto-refusal/; Jayati Ghosh, India 
faces criticism for blocking global trade deal but is it justified, THE GUARDIAN, 
Aug. 22, 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 
poverty-matters/2014/aug/22/india-criticism-blocking-global-trade-deal. 
8
 See Raymond Zhong and Peter Kenny, WTO Fails to Ratify Trade 
Agreement, Wall St. J., July 31, 2014, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-pressures-india-on-wto-trade-agreement-
1406820288 (On criticisms against India’s position from emerging mar-
kets/developing country members as well as developed country members); See 
India’s blocking of WTO deal triggers harsh criticism,” Aug. 1, 2014, 
http://www.dw.de/indias-blocking-of-wto-deal-triggers-harsh-criticism/a-
17825484; Armellini and Helen Maguire, Europe-Asia summit set to criticize 
India over WTO blockage, DPA INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 17, 2014, 
http://www.dpa-international.com/news/asia/europe-asia-summit-set-to-
criticize -india-over-wto-blockage-a-39923664.html; See Kerry challenges 
Modi over WTO stance, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AND TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 2, 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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members at the WTO have maintained silence over India’s con-
cerns on food security other than to affirm the devastating con-
sequences of failing to ratify the TFA.10 These members main-
tain this silence even in light of economic and policy grounds 
that may well publicly demonstrate the critical importance to 
India that its continued participation in global trade under 
multilateral trading rules would have in ensuring cheaper ac-
cess to food for India’s population and, ultimately, higher wag-
es for India’s poorest.11   
India’s choice to block ratification of the Protocol to the 
TFA was more a matter of how the WTO Membership could 
reach permanent decisions on food security with the same ex-
peditiousness as the TFA; –the WTO was indifferent to food se-
curity within the multilateral trade negotiation agenda. While 
the entire WTO membership was still negotiating a permanent 
solution on the critical issue of food security, the WTO Ministe-
rial Conference at Bali issued a Ministerial Decision that would 
have insulated India from suit under the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Mechanism for any of its public stockholdings for food se-
curity purposes.12  In response, India reiterated its position 
that resolving food security issues had to be prioritized with 
                                                                                                                                  
2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/ 
2014/08/02/2003596499. 
9
 See generally, Kent Jones, Green room politics and the WTO’s crisis of 
representation, 9 PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 3 (Oct. 2009), 349-57 
(On the heavy impact of unrepresentative Green Room members on WTO de-
cision-making). 
10
 Canada Statement on WTO Failure to Adopt Protocol for Trade Facili-
tation Agreement, Aug. 1, 2014, available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/comm/news-communiques/2014/08/01a. 
aspx?lang=eng; Statement by US Ambassador Michael Froman on the World 
Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement Protocol Failure, July 
2014, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2014/July/Statement-by-Amb-Froman-on-WTO-Trade-Facilitation-
Agreement-Protocol-Failure (last accessed Mar. 10, 2015); Statement by EU 
Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht on Trade Facilitation Agreement, Aug. 
4, 2014, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1144. 
11
 See e.g., Joshua Meltzer, Improving Indian Food Security:  Why Prime 
Minister Modi Should Embrace the WTO,  Brookings, May. 16, 2014, availa-
ble at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/05/16-world-trade-
organization-india-food-security-meltzer. 
12
 WTO Ministerial Decision of Dec. 7, 2013, Public stockholding for food 
security purposes, WT/MIN (13)/38, WT/L/913, available at 
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desci38_e.htm. 
3
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same emphasis as trade facilitation under the Bali ministerial 
decisions, stressing that  
overall balance is important even in a limited package of out-
comes.  The Bali outcomes were negotiated as a package and 
must be concluded as such . . . developing countries such as India 
must have the freedom to use food reserves to feed their poor 
without the threat of sanctions.13   
This call for rebalancing of priorities in multilateral trade 
negotiations, to specifically address food security, fully aligns 
with the conclusions and recommendations of Olivier De Schut-
ter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food: 
“Food security is presently treated under the WTO as the 
grounds for exceptions for a very limited range of trade liberali-
zation commitments.  A more appropriate reframing of agricul-
tural trade rules would explicitly recognize that market-
determined outcomes do not necessarily improve food security 
and that the purpose of agricultural trade rules should be to facil-
itate food security-enhancing policies, even though this may re-
quire limiting the pace of trade liberalization in some sectors 
and/or granting States additional policy flexibility in pursuit of 
international recognized food security objectives.  WTO Members 
should preserve and create a range of flexibilities in the Doha 
Round negotiations in order to ensure that the future interna-
tional trade regime operates in lock step with multilateral and 
national efforts to address food insecurity.  In particular, they 
should: 
1.  Make WTO measures more compatible with the pursuit of 
food security and the human right to food.  Negotiators should 
ensure that, for example, the future criteria of the green box does 
not impede the development of policies and programs to support 
food security and the realization of the right to food; and that 
they are tailored to the specific national circumstances of devel-
oping countries.  The proposed amendment in the draft agricul-
tural modalities to Annex 2 in the [Agreement on Agriculture] is 
of vital importance for many developing countries and should be 
agreed to immediately and without expectation of trade conces-
sions. 
                                                          
13
 Permanent solution on food security in WTO rules is a must, says Amit 
Narang LIVEMINT, Oct. 24, 2014, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/xzW8fnSJ2 
5UDdOsqZq5ddL/Permanent-solution-on-food-security-in-WTO-rules-is-
mustm-s.html (last accessed Mar. 10, 2015). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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2.  Exclude defining the establishment and management of food 
reserves as trade-distorting support, when these schemes serve 
the needs of food-insecure vulnerable groups.  States should also 
adapt the provisions of the [Agreement on Agriculture] and other 
WTO agreements (e.g. public procurement) to ensure compatibil-
ity with the establishment of food reserves at national, regional 
and international level; and they should bring clarity to the over-
lap of responsibilities and commitments which could impact the 
efforts of countries that engage in efforts to establish food re-
serves at regional level. 
3.  Ensure that marketing boards and supply management 
schemes are not prohibited in the future framework for agricul-
tural policy nor precluded under loan conditionality and other 
policy reforms by the international financial institutions. Options 
available under the WTO framework to establish such policies 
should be further explored. 
4.  Guarantee the possibility for developing States to insulate 
domestic markets from the volatility of prices on international 
markets.  States, particularly developing States in accordance 
with the principle of special and differential treatment, must re-
tain the freedom to take such measures.  The negotiations should 
i) strengthen and materialize the proposed safeguard measures – 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and Special Products (SPs); 
and ii) ensure that States maintain flexibilities to regulate the 
volume of imports in order for policies such as marketing boards 
and supply management schemes to be fully functional, as 
measures such as the SSM can only be implemented on a tempo-
rary basis.  In particular, the conditions should be put in place so 
that it is in the interests of developing countries to adopt tariff-
rate quotas on key tariff lines, and thus manage import volumes 
and price volatility more durably.  States should also carefully 
examine the impacts of additional cuts to tariffs on national food 
security.  States should refuse such cuts if they are unable to 
counterbalance negative impacts on food-insecure vulnerable 
groups with national policies, including social safety-nets and the 
creation of non-agricultural employment opportunities.  States 
should consider reducing tariffs on key inputs for agricultural 
production taking into account the need to promote increased 
food production in a sustainable and socially-inclusive manner. 
5.  Take steps to limit States’ excessive reliance on internation-
al trade in the pursuit of food security.  In building their capacity 
to produce the food needed to meet consumption needs, States 
should support in particular poor small-scale farmers and the 
5
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production of staple foods. 
6.  In the case of a failed Doha Round, propose medium and 
long-term changes to the existing WTO framework to ensure pro-
food security programs are not categorized as trade-distorting 
support.  This should include, for example, changes to the green 
box criteria and rules on safeguards.  Such changes should be 
fast-tracked and aimed at facilitating access to these measures 
without requiring additional concessions from food insecure de-
veloping countries.”14 
India’s ongoing deadlock with the WTO over food security 
and the ratification of the Protocol to the TFA may well signal 
the ‘death’ knell and crisis, which for many, reverberates 
throughout the WTO and the Doha Development Agenda.15 The 
deadlock signals a governance crisis for the WTO in addressing 
the competing public policy claims of WTO Members. It is 
symptomatic of an erroneously hardening ‘either-or’ approach 
used when asserting and engaging public policy at the WTO.  
Public policy could very well encompass both the State’s 
trade concerns, as well as other significant public interests en-
trusted to the State, such as environmental safety, social pro-
tection, and cultural preservation.16 This is clear from the na-
                                                          
14
 Olivier De Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food, The World Trade Organization and the Post-Global Food Crisis 
Agenda:  Putting Food Security First in the International Trade System, 
Briefing Note No. 4, 1,16-17 (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20111116_briefing_
note_05_en.pdf. 
15
 See Rorden Wilkinson, Of Butchery and Bicycles:  The WTO and the 
‘Death’ of the Doha Development Agenda, 83 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 2, 
395-401 (April-June 2012); David Kleimann and Joe Guinan, The Doha 
Round: An Obituary, Global Governance Programme Policy Brief, Issue 
2011/June 2011, available at 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/TheDohaR
ound_AnObituary_June2011.pdf; Surendra Bhandari, Doha Round Negotia-
tions:  Problems, Potential Outcomes, and Possible Implications, 4 TRADE LAW 
& DEVELOPMENT 2, 353-84 (2012); Susan C. Schwab, After Doha:  Why Nego-
tiations are Doomed and What We Should Do About It, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 90, 
104-117 (2011); Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy 
Crisis, 1 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 1, 7-22 (2002); SONIA E. ROLLAND, 
DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO 243-63 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012). 
16
 See Tristan Le Cotty and Tancrede Voituriez, The Potential Role for 
Collective Preferences in Determining the Rules of the International Trading 
System, 165, 178 in PAUL EKINS AND TANCREDE VOITURIEZ (EDS.), TRADE, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT:  A CRITICAL LOOK AT 
METHODS AND OUTCOMES 1 (Earthscan 2009). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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ture of public policy as a highly subjective, value-driven17 mat-
ter of governance undertaken by different authoritative deci-
sion-makers, at various levels, national and international.  By 
definition, public policy is vague as to any a priori content of 
policy,18 other than as to matters of source (e.g. ensuring that 
the policy arises from public decision-makers or public agen-
cies) and objective (e.g. aiming to address societal problems of a 
given population).19 Drawing from the original pioneering work 
of Harold Lasswell,20 policy process research looks to the analy-
sis of context in the policy cycle or the “key stages of policymak-
ing:  the ways in which people struggle to define issues as prob-
lems worthy of attention on government agendas; how people 
analyze problems and devise and select among policy alterna-
                                                          
17
 See Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and 
Public Policy:  Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE  L.J.2, 
203, 207 (Mar. 1943) (“None who deal with law, however, can escape policy 
when policy is defined as the making of important decisions which affect the 
distribution of values.”). 
18
 Robert E. Goodin, Martin Rein, and Michael Moran, The Public and its 
Policies, pp. 3-38 in MICHAEL MORAN, MARTIN REIN, AND ROBERT E. GOODIN 
(EDS.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). 
19
 MICHAEL HILL AND PETER HUPE, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY:  
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 1, 5  (SAGE Publications 2002) 
(“What is, in general, striking about the definitions of public policy indicated 
here is the purposive character public policies are expected to have, and the 
way in which they are expected to be related to (societal) problems.”); See 
generally CHARLES L. COCHRAN AND ELOISE F. MALONE, PUBLIC POLICY:  
PERSPECTIVES AND CHOICES 1, 3 (5th edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014) 
(“Public policy can be described as the overall framework within which gov-
ernment actions are undertaken to achieve public goals, with a good working 
definition of public policy, for our purposes, being the study of government 
decisions and actions designed to deal with a matter of public concern.  Poli-
cies are purposive courses of action devised in response to a perceived prob-
lem.  Public policies are filtered through a specific policy process, adopted, 
implemented through laws, regulatory measures, courses of government ac-
tion, and funding priorities, and enforced by a public agency.  Individuals and 
groups attempt to shape public policy through the mobilization of interest 
groups, advocacy education, and political lobbying.  Official policy provides 
guidance to governments over a range of actions and also provides mutual 
accountability links between the government and its citizens.  The policy pro-
cess includes several key aspects:  a definition of the problem to be addressed, 
the goals the policy is designed to achieve, and the instruments of policy that 
are employed to address the problem and achieve the policy goals.  Public pol-
icy is the heart, soul, and identity of governments everywhere.”). 
20
 Harold D. Lasswell, The policy orientation in DANIEL LERNER AND 
HAROLD D. LASSWELL (EDS.), THE POLICY SCIENCES:  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
SCOPE AND METHOD, 1, 3-15 (STAN. Univ.Press, 1959).   
7
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tives; how people implement policy; and how people evaluate 
and sometimes terminate policy.”21   
With these conceptual clarifications, one can reasonably 
accept that compliance with the rules of multilateral trade is 
itself also a matter of public policy.22  When the WTO speaks of 
balancing “national public policy” and “free trade”, it is in reali-
ty  speaking of competing priorities of public policy decision-
making, (which takes place at the national level of a State that 
is a WTO Member) and collective multilateral level decision-
making under the WTO’s political organs and dispute settle-
ment functions.  The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration prom-
ised that the WTO membership would collectively undertake 
the task of balancing public policies and integrate trade with 
sustainable development: 
“2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of 
economic development and the alleviation of poverty.  We recog-
nize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased op-
portunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading sys-
tem generates.  The majority of WTO members are developing 
countries.  We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart 
of the Work Program adopted in this Declaration.  Recalling the 
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to 
make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing coun-
tries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a 
share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs 
of their economic development.  In this context, enhanced market 
access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed 
technical assistance and capacity-building programs have im-
portant roles to play . . . . 
6.  We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sus-
tainable development, as stated in the Preamble to the Marra-
kesh Agreement. We are convinced that the aims of upholding 
                                                          
21
 Peter de Leon and Christopher M. Weible, Policy Process Research for 
Democracy:  A Commentary on Lasswell’s Vision, 1 International Journal of 
Policy Studies 2, 23, 23-34 (2010). 
22
 See Tonia Novitz, International law and human rights in the context of 
globalization in PATRICIA KENNETT (ED.), GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY, 107, 120 (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2008); See World Trade 
Report 2012, Part II, Trade and public policies: A closer look at non-tariff 
measures in the 21st century, 36-46, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr12-2a_e.pdf (last ac-
cessed Mar. 10, 2015). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral 
trading system, and acting for the protection of the environment 
and the promotion of sustainable development can and must be 
mutually supportive.  We take note of the efforts by members to 
conduct national environmental assessments of trade policies on 
a voluntary basis.  We recognize that under WTO rules no coun-
try should be prevented from taking measures for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at 
the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement 
that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the 
provisions of the WTO Agreements.  We welcome the WTO’s con-
tinued cooperation with UNEP and other intergovernmental en-
vironmental organizations.  We encourage efforts to promote co-
operation between the WTO and relevant international 
environmental and developmental organizations. 
8.  We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministeri-
al Conference regarding internationally recognized core labour 
standards.  We take note of work under way in the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globaliza-
tion. 
10.  Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO 
membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure in-
ternal transparency and the effective participation of all members.  
While emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the organ-
ization, we are committed to making the WTO’s operations more 
transparent, including through more effective and prompt dis-
semination of information, and to improve dialogue with the pub-
lic.  We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels 
continue to promote a better public understanding of the WTO 
and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based multi-
lateral trading system.”23 
Thus, it is clear that the multilateral trade agenda, since 
the start of the Doha Round in 2001, was precisely intended to 
integrate national and international public policy discourses.  
The international community cannot frame public policy under 
a simplistic ‘either-or’ dilemma, where States must choose be-
                                                          
23
 WTO Ministerial Declaration, Doha, Nov. 14, 2001, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (last 
accessed Mar. 10, 2015).  Italics added. 
9
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tween trade interests and non-trade objectives.  Rather, the 
fundamental paradigmatic shift acknowledged in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration (if not implemented in practice to date 
in stalled trade negotiations) is to reexamine the functional de-
cisions and interactions of the WTO and its Members. It is also 
ensuring that the overall global wealth created from increasing 
trade liberalization and expanding foreign market access under 
the WTO system is not being generated through multiple social 
externalities, such as: means and processes of production that 
incur severe and unjustifiable environmental damages; permit-
ting oppressive labor conditions, tolerating food insecurity and 
the debilitating dislocations bred by poverty; accepting the de-
mise of cultural traditions and theft of indigenous knowledge; 
and rigidly incapacitating the abilities of WTO Member States 
to govern in ways that render them unable to respond rapidly 
to economic crises and emergencies in their jurisdictions, nor 
appropriately address fluctuating public policy needs of their 
citizens.24   
The Doha Ministerial Declaration expressly hearkens back 
to the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, which mandates the WTO and its 
Members with the duty of:  
recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising the stand-
ards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and ex-
panding the production of and trade in goods and services, while 
allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accord-
ance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
to protect the and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.25   
Balancing national public policy and free trade is thus a 
                                                          
24
 See WTO Secretariat, Harnessing trade for sustainable development 
and a green economy, 2011, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/brochure_rio_20_e.pdf (last 
accessed Mar. 10, 2015). 
25
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (last accessed Oct. 1, 
2014) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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matter for cyclical coordination26 by WTO Members.  This is 
primarily to ensure trade and non-trade policy compliance, par-
ticularly since the survival of the world trade system also de-
pends on prohibiting unjustified trade distortions and disman-
tling pretextual State protectionism.  Such protectionism 
prevents consumers and producers from benefiting from the 
most efficient prices and production of goods and services all 
over the world.27 The task of balancing national public policy 
and free trade requires, at its core, an understanding of the 
ways in which the world trade system responds to felt resource, 
environmental, and social inequalities that unjustifiably un-
dergird trade.28  
Balancing free trade commitments with other national 
public policies is ultimately a search for sustainable policy flex-
ibility – one that enables WTO Members’ transparent calibra-
tion of all public policy interests (trade, environment, economic 
social and cultural rights, among others) in a manner that is 
both accountable to its citizens and responsible to all other par-
ticipants in world trade.  In order to achieve sustainable policy 
                                                          
26
 See YVES BONZON, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMACY IN THE WTO 
1, 136 (Cambridge Univer. Press, 2014) (“…policy coordination would have 
the benefit of regulating the interface between domestic regulations and 
WTO principles so as to ‘insulate from the scrutiny of negative integration 
domestic regulation that is assumed either non-protectionist or efficient, be-
cause it conforms to international regulation.’  When faced with sensitive 
questions, it can be observed that the dispute settlement organs have re-
ferred on occasions to instruments of policy coordination originating outside 
the WTO, a practice that some have referred to as ‘judicial activism.’  The 
dispute settlement organs have thus shown a preference for trade measures 
that are directly aimed at the protection of multilaterally approved goals or 
interests”). 
27
 See SALLIE JAMES & K. WILLIAM WATSON, Regulatory Protectionism: A 
Hidden Threat to Free Trade, Cato Inst. Policy Analysis,723 POLICY ANALYSIS  
1 (Apr. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa723.pdf (last accessed Mar. 
11, 2015); ROBERT HOWSE, REGULATORY MEASURES, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 458 (Martin Daunton, Amrita Narlikar & 
Robert M. Stern eds., 2012). 
28
 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3-10 (2002); 
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, part III, (Harvard 
Univ. Press, 2014); Ajit K. Ghose, Global Economic Inequality and Interna-
tional Trade, International Labour Organization, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 
229-52 (2001), available at 
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/2/229.full.pdf+html (last accessed 
Mar. 12, 2015). 
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flexibility, this Article contends that public policy interests 
within the WTO system require better functional and institu-
tional coordination on all three functional pillars of the WTO – 
trade negotiations, dispute settlement, and trade monitoring.  
This Article also takes the position that such public policy in-
terests also require the empirical integration of WTO Members’ 
preexisting international commitments on environmental du-
ties and on economic, social, and cultural rights to better in-
form the public policy coordination process.  This approach to 
balancing economic and social objectives through an emerging 
principle of coordination is modeled after the method adopted 
by the International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) case.29  In interpreting a 
treaty-based regime in regard to the joint demands of economic 
development and environmental protection when using a 
shared resource, the Court emphasized the importance of con-
tinuous cooperation and coordination between States to accom-
plish both objectives: 
“76.  In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the Court, after recalling 
that ‘[t]his need to reconcile economic development with protec-
tion of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sus-
tainable development’, and added that ‘[i]t is for the Parties 
themselves to find an agreed solution that takes account of the 
objectives of the Treaty’… 
77.  The Court observes that it is by cooperating that the States 
concerned can jointly manage the risks of damage to the envi-
ronment that might be created by the plans initiated by one or 
other of them, so as to prevent the damage in question, through 
the performance of both the procedural and the substantive obli-
gations laid down by the 1975 Statute.  However, whereas the 
substantive obligations are frequently worded in broad terms, the 
procedural obligations are narrower and more specific, so as to 
facilitate the implementation of the 1975 Statute through a pro-
cess of continuous consultation between the parties concerned… 
177.  Regarding Article 27 [of the 1975 Statute], it is the view of 
the Court that its formulation reflects not only the need to recon-
cile the varied interests of riparian States in a transboundary 
context and in particular in the use of a shared natural resource, 
                                                          
29
 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 
2010 I.C.J. 14, paras. 75, 181-89 (Apr. 20). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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but also the need to strike a balance between the use of the waters 
and the protection of the river consistent with the objective sus-
tainable development…Article 27 embodies this interconnected-
ness between equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared re-
source and the balance between economic development and 
environmental protection that is the essence of sustainable de-
velopment.”30 
To date, the WTO lacks a functional system for coordinat-
ing the protection of trade and non-trade public policies of 
WTO members. Part II (Segmented Efforts at Balancing 
National Public Policy and Free Trade through the DSU, 
TPRM, and Trade Negotiations) discusses how public policy 
provisions in the WTO covered Agreements are unequally im-
plemented and variably engaged within the three functional 
pillars of the WTO. These functional pillars are, namely, as fol-
lows: dispute settlement, as facilitated by the WTO dispute set-
tlement organs (the Appellate Body and dispute settlement 
Panels) pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU);31 trade monitoring conducted through the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM) administered by the WTO General 
Council acting in the capacity of the Trade Policy Review Board 
(TPRB);32 and trade negotiations under the WTO Ministerial 
Conference, the supreme decision-making body of the WTO.33  
Although there are numerous provisions in the WTO agree-
ments that enable WTO Members to calibrate their compliance 
with trade commitments and other significant public policy 
                                                          
30
 Id. at paras. 76-77, 177.  Italics added. 
31
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (last accessed Mar. 
12, 2015) [hereinafter DSU]. 
32
 Trade Policy Review Mechanism art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement, Annex 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/29-tprm_e.htm (last accessed Mar. 
12 2015);  See Fact Sheet from Steffen Grammling, FES Geneva, WTO’s 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Explanations and Reflections, Dialogue on 
Globalization No. 3 (Apr. 2009); Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Main-
taining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade Order:  A Proposal 
to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1, 9-36 (2013).  
33
 Marrakesh Agreement, art. IV:1-4, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154. 
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priorities,34 there is no formal mechanism or mandate that re-
quires deliberate cross-referencing between the WTO political 
organs and dispute settlement organs in discharging their 
functions in that calibration process. One, therefore, finds more 
development on the interpretation of public policy exceptions 
(as in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV) in the jurispru-
dence of the Appellate Body and Panels, in contrast to the 
scant consideration afforded for a WTO Member’s public policy 
programming and priorities within the TPRM process, or the 
awkward compartmentalization of “trade issues” and “non-
trade” issues in the trade negotiations process manifested in 
the deadlocks in Doha and Bali. 
Part III (The Public Policy Institutional Deficits in 
the WTO System:  Who Undertakes ‘Balancing’?) discuss-
es the unequal participation and leveraged access to infor-
mation between and among WTO Members (Green Room 
members vis-à-vis other coalitions), as well as those involving 
States as WTO Members vis-à-vis other non-State public policy 
stakeholders, such as public interest groups, civil society or 
nongovernmental organizations, international institutions, and 
UN specialized agencies.35  While each WTO Member has an 
                                                          
34
 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Trade 
in Services art. XIV, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement art. 
2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; Special and differential treatment 
provisions, WT/COMTD/W/196, June 14, 2013 [hereinafter S&D]; Balance of 
Payments Measures, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XII Oct. 
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1, 55 U.N.T.S 194; see GATT Article XII, GATT 1994 Ar-
ticle XVIII:B, & GATS Article XII:1. For discussion of public policy provisions 
in the WTO covered agreements, see ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM:  LAW, 
POLITICS, AND LEGITIMACY 82 (Cameron May, 2007); DESIERTO 2015, at Chap-
ter 3. 
35
 JOHN H. BARTON, JUDITH L. GOLDSTEIN, TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, & RICHARD 
H. STEINBERG, THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME:  POLITICS, LAW, AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 61 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2006) (on 
the politics of the GATT/WTO legal system); Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza and 
Marie Wilke, Revisiting the Single Undertaking: Towards More Balanced Ap-
proach to WTO Negotiations 486 in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE 
WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT:  PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES NEED PINCITE (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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equal vote in trade negotiations in theory, participation varies 
in practice.  Specifically, participation varies according to in-
ternational economic and political influence, the capacity to ef-
fectively use the political processes of the WTO, and the basic 
ability to detect foreign market access violations and marshal 
the resources necessary to avail of the dispute settlement sys-
tem.36  If systemic reforms to participation and transparency 
(rather than incremental reforms) are not fully designed across 
all three functional pillars of the WTO, then it will continue to 
be difficult to foster durable decisions on calibrating national 
public policy and free trade; furthermore, WTO Members, pri-
vate sector trade associations, and non-State public policy 
stakeholders at large will generally not accept these reforms, 
nor perceive them as legitimate.  
In the Conclusion (Actualizing the ‘Principles of Co-
ordination and Cooperation’ – The WTO as the Forum 
for International Public Policy), this Article emphasizes 
that normatively reorienting international trade policy within 
the spectrum of numerous public policies of WTO Members to 
include environmental duties and economic social and cultural 
rights, while also realigning governance functions and partici-
pation rights at the WTO, would help save the WTO from grow-
ing perceptions of diminished relevance and institutional ille-
gitimacy.37  Sustainable policy flexibility, as originally 
                                                          
36
 KATI KULOVESI, THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:  CHALLENGES 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT, LEGITIMACY AND FRAGMENTATION 26-27 (2011) (“The 153 
Members of the WTO are remarkably unequal in terms of size, population as 
well economic and political weight.  According to Zampetti, such inequality 
‘translates into an asymmetry in the ability to participate in decision-making 
processes, as such democratically suspect if not illegitimate which has the po-
tential to perpetuate if not reinforce an uneven distribution of benefits and 
burdens in the world economy.’  In addition, many smaller developing coun-
tries also lack the capacity and human resources to participate efficiently in 
the WTO processes.  The Geneva missions of the most influential WTO Mem-
bers, such as Canada, the European Community, Japan, and the US have 
several professionals dealing exclusively with WTO issues.  In contrast, de-
veloping country diplomats tend to represent their countries also in numer-
ous other international agencies and not all developing country Members 
even have permanent missions in Geneva.  This makes it difficult for such 
countries to participate effectively in the functioning of the WTO or to keep 
their national constituencies adequately informed”). 
37
 See Henry Gao & C.L. Lim, Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrele-
vance:  The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a ‘Common Good’ for RTA 
Disputes, 11 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 4, 899-925 (2008). 
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envisaged in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the WTO, materializes only when the WTO recognizes 
that its functional pillars must approach public policy balanc-
ing through a textured understanding of a ‘law of coordina-
tion’38 based on the law-making agreements of States. 
II.  SEGMENTED EFFORTS AT BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC 
POLICY AND FREE TRADE THROUGH THE DSU, TPRM, AND 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
Public policy issues in the trade context have been differ-
entially approached and valued within the WTO’s three func-
tional pillars.  There has been more development in the inter-
pretive practices of the WTO dispute settlement organs in 
regard to treaty provisions as they relate to public policy excep-
tions in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV, in contrast to 
the trade policy review process or the multilateral trade nego-
tiations process. 
A. ‘Public Policy’ Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body 
and Panels 
Article 3(2) of the WTO DSU expressly provides that dis-
pute settlement at the WTO  
is a central element in providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system.  The Members recognize that it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under 
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpre-
tation of public international law.  Recommendations and rulings 
of the [Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.39   
Dispute settlement must thus stay within this fundamen-
tal remit of conducting ‘clarification’ of existing provisions of 
WTO agreements in order to ‘preserve’ the rights and obliga-
tions of WTO Members as detailed in the WTO agreements. 
In practice, the WTO Appellate Body and Panels demon-
                                                          
38
 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INT’L CMTY 415-16 
(5th ed., 2008).   
39
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, supra note 34, at art. 3(2). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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strate a broad understanding of their duty to clarify provisions 
in the WTO agreements that inherently contemplate calibra-
tion or enable flexible ‘policy space’ for WTO Members,40 and, 
in turn, appear amenable to the application of a “principle of 
proportionality” when interpreting ‘public policy calibration 
provisions’.41 Apart from proportionality, various jurispruden-
tial tests have also been developed in the interpretation of the 
public policy calibration provisions in the WTO agreements, in-
cluding, for example, tests of “reasonableness”42 as well as “ne-
                                                          
40
 Olivier Cattaneo, Has the WTO Gone Too Far or Not Far Enough?  
Some Reflections on the Concept of ‘Policy Space’ 57, 77-78, in CHALLENGES 
AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO (2005) (“In practice, WTO panels and the Appel-
late Body have contributed to the preservation and broadening of Members’ 
policy space by emphasizing Members’ freedom to regulate as they wish, ex-
cept to the extent that WTO provisions restrain them from doing so.  For ex-
ample in US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body recognized that WTO Members 
‘have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the en-
vironment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objec-
tives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement.’  In rela-
tion to several trade remedy provisions, panels and the Appellate Body have 
pointed out that the methodology to be used is not prescribed and that Mem-
bers may therefore determine what methodology to use.  In Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverages II, the Appellate Body similarly underlined that WTO rules ‘are 
not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgments in 
confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real 
cases in the real world.  Finally, in EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body recog-
nized Members’ policy space by stating that ‘[w]e cannot lightly assume that 
sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the more onerous, ra-
ther than the less burdensome obligation by mandating conformity or com-
pliance with such standards, guidelines and recommendations.  To sustain 
such an assumption and to warrant such a far-reaching interpretation, treaty 
language far more specific and compelling than that found in Article 3 of the 
SPS Agreement would be necessary”). 
41
 Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality and Balancing in 
WTO Law: A Comparative Perspective 147, 166-67 in THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES (2008); Axel Desmedt, Proportionality 
in WTO Law, 4 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 3, 441-80 (2001); Andrew D. Mitchell, Pro-
portionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 5, 985-1008 
(2007).   
42
 Catherine Button, The WTO’s ‘Objective Assessment’ Standard of Re-
view and Panel Review of Health Measures 85-114 in CHALLENGES AND 
PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 110 (Andrew D. Mitchell ed., 2005) (“Reasonable-
ness also recommends itself as a standard of review because the concept is 
familiar to panels and the WTO.  First, the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agree-
ment and GATT are all littered with references to obligations that are ex-
pressly qualified by the concept of reasonableness….Moreover, Panels and 
the Appellate Body have frequently turned to reasonableness when interpret-
ing the Agreements…In short, the concept of reasonableness is not entirely at 
odds with GATT/WTO review”). 
17
3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:41 PM 
566 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::2 
cessity.”43  Ultimately, however, the scope of discretion that 
WTO tribunals assume when crafting these tests turns on the 
textual elasticity of each public policy calibration provision.  
The following subsections sketch some of these differences. 
1. General exceptions under GATT Article XX and GATS 
Article XIV 
The WTO Appellate Body and Panels have developed a 
fairly substantial body of jurisprudence interpreting several of 
the specific enumerated exceptions under GATT Article XX and 
GATS Article XIV.44  These provisions operate as complete de-
fenses for a WTO Member seeking to justify measures that 
would ordinarily be trade-restrictive or would not otherwise 
conform to any of the obligations under GATT or GATS.45 
These exceptions do not apply to obligations other than those 
under GATT and GATS, respectively.46  The Appellate Body 
and Panels interpret GATT Article XX and GATS XIV follow-
ing the same two-tiered methodology.47 First, by provisionally 
                                                          
43
 See Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded 
Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J. OF 
INT’L ECON. L. 1, 153-73 (2009); Panagiotis Delimatsis, Determining the Ne-
cessity of Domestic Regulations in Services:  The Best is Yet to Come, 19 EUR. 
J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 2, 365-408 (2008); WTO: TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND SPS 
MEASURES 94 (Anja Seibert-Fohr, Peter Tobias-Stoll & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 
2007) (“When one applies the necessity test as developed by the panels and 
the Appellate body, the existence of an international obligation to respect the 
right in question will be a strong indicator of the importance of the values 
protected by the measure, and even more so if the obligation has the status of 
jus cogens”). 
44
 See ANTONIA ELIASON, ROBERT HOWSE & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 656-780 (4th ed., 2013); PETER VAN DEN 
BOSSCHE AND WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 543-605 (3rd ed., 2013) [hereinafter VAN DEN BOSSCHE AND 
ZDOUC]. 
45
 See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT:  TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND 
THE FUTURE 48 (1994); VAN DEN BOSSCHE AND ZDOUC, supra note 47, at 546-
47. 
46
 China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
¶ 307, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/D2395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 30 2012). 
47
 See United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 29 1996) (“In order that the justifying protec-
tion of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only 
come under one or another of the particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j) 
– listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by 
the opening clauses of Article XX.  The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered:  
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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examining if the WTO Member establishes that its defense ap-
plies under specific enumerated exception; and second, by de-
termining if the WTO Member also demonstrates that the gen-
eral requirements of the chapeau to the pertinent provision has 
been met. Considering the extraordinary impact of GATT Arti-
cle XX and GATS Article XIV as defenses that would, if appli-
cable, prevent any finding of liability for breach of WTO obliga-
tions from attaching to the WTO Member that issued the 
challenged domestic measure, it is unsurprising that the Appel-
late Body and the Panels appear to strive for restraint when 
calibrating the ordinarily trade-restrictive measure with the 
WTO Member’s assertion of public policy interests as enumer-
ated in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV.  For example, 
the “public morals” specific exception in GATT Article XX(a) 
and GATS Article XIV(b) refers to “standards of right and 
wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation.”48  In EU-Seal Products, the Appellate Body clarified 
                                                                                                                                  
first, provisional justification by reason of the characterization of the meas-
ure…second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory 
clauses of Article XX.”) [hereafter, “US-Gasoline Appellate Body Report”]; 
United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, ¶ 292, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (“Article XIV of the 
GATS, like Article XX of the GATT 1994, contemplates a ‘two-tier analysis’ of 
a measure that a Member seeks to justify under that provision.  A panel 
should first determine whether the challenged measure falls within the scope 
of one of the paragraphs of Article XIV.  This requires that the challenged 
measure address the particular interest specified in that paragraph and 
there be a sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest protected.  
The required nexus – or ‘degree of connection’ – between the measure and the 
interest is specified in the language of the paragraphs themselves, through 
the use of terms such as ‘relating to’ and ‘necessary to’.  Where the challenged 
measure has been found to fall within one of the paragraphs of Article XIV, a 
panel should then consider whether that measure satisfies the requirements 
of the chapeau of Article XIV”) [hereafter, “US-Gambling Appellate Body Re-
port”]. 
48
 China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 7.759, 
WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12 2009) (“…The panel in US-Gambling, in an interpreta-
tion not questioned by the Appellate Body, found that ‘the term ‘public mor-
als’ denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf 
of a community or nation’.  The panel went on to note that ‘the content of 
these concepts for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon a 
range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious 
values . . . Members, in applying this and other similar societal concepts, 
‘should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts 
of ‘public morals’ . . . in their respective territories, according to their own 
19
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the nature of the balancing test to ascertain the necessity of 
the challenged measure under the “public morals” exception: 
As we noted, the Appellate Body has explained in several dis-
putes that a necessity analysis involves a process of ‘weighing 
and balancing’ a series of factors, including the importance of the 
objective, the contribution of the measure to that objective, and 
the trade-restrictiveness of the measure.  The Appellate Body has 
further explained that, in most cases, a comparison between the 
challenged measure and possible alternatives should then be un-
dertaken.  As the Appellate Body has stated, ‘it is on the basis of 
this ‘weighing and balancing’ and comparison of measures, tak-
ing into account the interests or values at stake, that a panel de-
termines whether a measure is ‘necessary’ or, alternatively, 
whether another, WTO-consistent measures is ‘reasonably avail-
able’.  Such an analysis, the Appellate Body has observed, in-
volves a ‘holistic’ weighing and balancing exercise ‘that involves 
putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating 
them in relation to each other after having examined them indi-
vidually, in order to reach an overall judgment. A measure’s con-
tribution is thus only one component of the necessity calculus 
under Article XX.  This means that whether a measure is ‘neces-
sary’ cannot be determined by the level of contribution alone, but 
will depend on the manner in which the other factors of the ne-
cessity analysis, including a consideration of potential alternative 
measures, inform the analysis.  It will also depend on the nature, 
quantity, and quality of evidence, and whether a panel’s analysis 
is performed in quantitative or qualitative terms.  Indeed, the 
very utility of examining the interaction between the various fac-
tors of the necessity analysis, and conducting a comparison with 
potential alternative measures, is that it provides a means of 
testing these factors as part of a holistic weighing and balancing 
exercise, whether quantitative or qualitative in nature.  The flex-
ibility of such an exercise does not allow for the setting of pre-
determined thresholds in respect of any particular factor.  If the 
level of contribution alone cannot determine whether a measure 
is necessary or not, we do not see that mandating in advance a 
pre-determined threshold level of contribution would be instruc-
tive or warranted in a necessity analysis.49 
While tribunals have been quite deferential towards the 
                                                                                                                                  
systems and scales of values”). 
49
 European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.214-15, WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R 
(May 22, 2014) [hereinafter EU-Seal Products, Appellate Body Report]. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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WTO Member’s assertion of the content of “public morals,” they 
nevertheless tend to be stringent when assessing whether the 
challenged domestic measure indeed makes a ‘material contri-
bution’ to the protection of such public morals. 50 Where a com-
plaining party identifies an alternative measure that, in its 
view, the responding WTO Member should have taken, the re-
sponding WTO Member thereafter assumes the burden of 
showing why the proposed alternative is not ‘reasonably avail-
able’ in light of the interests or values pursued and the party’s 
desired level of protection.51  The application of the GATT Arti-
cle XX or GATS Article XIV chapeau requirements (e.g. ‘arbi-
trary discrimination’) is also interpreted with particularity, de-
pending on the nature of the specific enumerated exception 
that the WTO member invokes as a defense.52  In EU-Seal 
Products, the Appellate Body affirmed that the chapeau to 
GATT Article XX refers to the “manner in which a measure. . . 
is applied;” accordingly, it would be relevant to  
                                                          
50
 China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶¶ 263-69, 
294, WT/DSR63/AB/R, Dec. 21, 2009 (“[T]he Panel simply stated that limiting 
the number of import entities ‘can make a material contribution’ to the pro-
tection of public morals in China.  Yet, the Panel neither addressed quantita-
tive projections nor provided qualitative reasoning based on evidence before it 
to support that finding . . . For these reasons we disagree with the Panel’s 
finding that China had met its burden of proof regarding the contribution of 
the State plan requirement to the protection of public morals in China”) 
[hereinafter China – Audiovisual Publications Appellate Body Report]; United 
States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, ¶¶ 296-99, 304-06, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter US-
Gambling Appellate Body Report]. 
51
 China – Audiovisual Publications Appellate Body Report, supra note 53 
at ¶¶ 319-332; US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 53 at ¶¶ 307-
311, 317 (“In our view, the Panel’s ‘necessity’ analysis was flawed because it 
did not focus on an alternative measure that was reasonably available to the 
United States to achieve the stated objectives regarding the protection of 
public morals or the maintenance of public order.  Engaging in consultations 
with Antigua, with a view to arriving at a negotiated settlement that 
achieves the same objectives as the challenged United States’ measures, was 
not an appropriate alternative for the Panel to consider because consultations 
are by definition a process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore 
not capable of comparison with the measures at issue in this case”). 
52
 Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Im-
ported Grain, ¶¶ 109-10, WT/DS276/AB/R (Aug. 30 2004) [hereinafter Cana-
da-Wheat Appellate Body Report]; United States – Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 120, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12 1998) 
[hereinafter US-Shrimp Appellate Body Report]. 
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consider the design, architecture, and revealing structure of a 
measure in order to establish whether the measure, in its actual 
or expected application, constitutes a means of arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where the same con-
ditions prevail.  This involves a consideration of both ‘substantive 
and procedural requirements’ under the measure at issue.53   
Applying this understanding of the chapeau requirements, 
the Appellate body found that various features of the EU Seal 
Regime constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail.54 
Tribunals have also observed deference when it comes to a 
WTO Member’s definition of environmental concerns within 
the purview of measures necessary for the protection of human, 
animal, or plant life or health under GATT Article XX(b) and 
GATS Article XIV(b), or measures relating to the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources under GATT Article XX(g).55  
                                                          
53
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting 
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.302 WT/DS400/AB/R, 
WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/400_401abr_e.pdf. 
54
 Id. at ¶ 5.338 (“First, we found that the European Union did not show 
that the manner in which the EU Seal Regime treats seal products derived 
from IC hunts as compared to seal products derived from ‘commercial’ hunts 
can be reconciled with the objective of addressing EU public moral concerns 
regarding seal welfare.  Second, we found considerable ambiguity in the ‘sub-
sistence’ and ‘partial use’ criteria of the IC exception.  Given the ambiguity of 
these criteria and the broad discretion that the recognized bodies consequent-
ly enjoy in applying them, seal products derived from what should in fact be 
properly characterized as ‘commercial’ hunts could potentially enter the EU 
market under the IC exception.  We did not consider that the European Un-
ion has sufficiently explained how such instances can be prevented in the ap-
plication of the IC exception.  Finally, we were not persuaded that the Euro-
pean Union has made ‘comparable efforts’ to facilitate the access of the 
Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did with respect to the Greenland 
Inuit.  We also noted that setting up a ‘recognized body’ that fulfills all the 
requirements of Article 6 of the Implementing Regulation may entail signifi-
cant burdens in some instances.”). 
55
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 7.1 WT/DS2/R (May 20,1996), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/438_444_445r_e.pdf  (“Under 
the General Agreement, WTO Members were free to set their own environ-
mental objectives, but they were bound to implement these objectives 
through measures consistent with its provisions, notably those on the relative 
treatment of domestic and imported products.”) [hereinafter US-Gasoline 
Panel Report]; Id. at 30 (“Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and 
in the Decision on Trade and Environment, there is specific acknowledgment 
to be found about the importance of coordinating policies on trade and the 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
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To prove these environmental exceptions, tribunals retain a 
“margin of discretion in assessing the value of evidence, and 
the weight to be ascribed to that evidence.”56 While tribunals 
observe deference towards how WTO Members identify and de-
fine their environmental objectives and targeted levels of envi-
ronmental protection, the measures that they design to ad-
vance these objectives and meet these targets remain subject to 
scrutiny.  Thus, when invoking the exceptions under GATT Ar-
ticle XX(b) or GATS Article XIV(b), the WTO Member has to 
satisfy the test of “necessity.”57 This test involves scrutiny of 
the challenged measures’ contribution to the achievement of 
the WTO Member’s environmental objective, looking at the 
“genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective 
pursued and the measure at issue.  The selection of a method-
ology to assess a measure’s contribution is a function of the na-
ture of the risk, the objective pursued, and the level of protec-
tion sought. It ultimately also depends on the nature, quantity, 
and quality of evidence existing at the time the analysis is 
made.”58  In EC-Asbestos, the Appellate Body further stressed 
that “there is no requirement under Article XX(b) of the GATT 
1994 to quantify, as such, the risk to human life or health. A 
risk may be evaluated in quantitative or qualitative terms. . . . 
                                                                                                                                  
environment.  WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to deter-
mine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with 
trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they 
enact and implement.  So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circum-
scribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General Agree-
ment and the other covered agreements.”) [hereinafter Standards for Refor-
mulated and Conventional Gasoline]. 
56
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 161, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 
12, 2001), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135abr_e.pdf [hereinafter EC-
Asbestos Appellate Body Report]. 
57
 See Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law:  Retreaded 
Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J INT’L 
ECON. L. 1 , 153-173 (2009),; see also Filippo Fontanelli, Necessity Killed the 
GATT – Article XX GATT and the Misleading Rhetoric about ‘Weighing and 
Balancing’, 5 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 2, 36-56 (2012). (For the view that ‘no real 
balancing is ever performed’, and that the process of construing the necessity 
requirement is ‘arguably less value-neutral than the quasi-judicial bodies 
claim it to be’). 
58
 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retread-
ed Tyres, ¶ 145 WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007), [hereinafter Brazil – Re-
treaded Tyres Appellate Body Report]. 
23
3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:41 PM 
572 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::2 
it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to deter-
mine the level of protection of health that they consider appro-
priate in a given situation.”59   Along with the test of necessity, 
the WTO Member has to show that there are no reasonably 
available alternatives to achieve the desired level of health pro-
tection.60 Various factors would have to be considered in deter-
mining whether alternative measures are indeed ‘reasonably 
available’ to protect human health including: 1) whether the 
responding Member “could reasonably be expected to employ 
[the alternative measure] to achieve its health policy objec-
tives,” (in addition to showing the difficulty of implementation 
of the challenged measure);61 2) whether the alternative meas-
ure “contributes to the realization of the end pur-
sued…[particularly] the preservation of human life and 
health;”62 and 3) “whether there is an alternative measure that 
would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade 
than a prohibition.”63  The materiality of the contribution of the 
measure to the preservation of human life and health could be 
quantitative or qualitative in nature. 64 
Tribunals apply a similar necessity test in relation to the 
environmental exception in GATT Article XX(g) on measures 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, 
                                                          
59
 See Measuring Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
supra note 59, at ¶¶ 167-168. 
60
 See Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra 
note 58, at 14-22. 
61
 See Measuring Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
supra note 59, at ¶ 170. 
62
 Id. at ¶ 172. 
63
 Id. 
64
 See Brazil – Retreaded Tyres Appellate Body Report, supra note 61, at 
¶ 151 (“In order to justify an import ban under Article XX(b), a panel must be 
satisfied that it brings about a material contribution to the achievement of its 
objective.  Such a demonstration can of course be made by resorting to evi-
dence or data, pertaining to the past or the present, that establish that the 
import ban at issue makes a material contribution to the protection of public 
health or environmental objectives pursued.  This is not, however, the only 
type of demonstration that could establish such a contribution.  Thus, a panel 
might conclude that an import ban is necessary on the basis of a demonstra-
tion that the import ban at issue is apt to produce a material contribution to 
the achievement of its objective.  This demonstration could consist of quanti-
tative projections in the future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of hy-
potheses that are tested and supported by sufficient evidence.”).  (Italics add-
ed). 
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if such measures are made effective in conjunction with re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption.”65  In US-
Shrimp, the Appellate Body declared that the environmental 
exception was not limited to mineral or non-living resources, 
but extended to living species that “are in certain circumstanc-
es indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, 
frequently because of human activities.”66  The Appellate Body 
further clarified that the term “natural resources” in GATT Ar-
ticle XX(g) was “not static in its content or reference but is ra-
ther by definition, evolutionary.”67  Moreover, the trade-
restrictive measure under GATT Article XX(g) also contem-
plates “even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions,” in 
that counterpart restrictions should have also been placed on 
domestically produced like products for the same conservation-
ist reasons.68 
Despite the seeming doctrinal smoothness of the balancing 
methodology articulated by the Appellate Body and Panels, it 
should nonetheless be stressed that the balancing performed 
under the tests developed for the GATT Article XX and GATS 
Article XIV exceptions is not a mathematically precise task.  
Donald Regan points out the logical contradiction between say-
ing that a WTO Member is entitled to choose its own legitimate 
domestic goal and articulating the level of protection to achieve 
such goal; at the same time the Member’s choice is subject to a 
balancing test that exogenously compares the challenged 
                                                          
65
 Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal 
Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7 1990), at 21 [hereinafter, Thai-
Cigarettes Panel Report] (“The Panel could see no reason why under Article 
XX the meaning of the term ‘necessary’ under paragraph (d) should not be the 
same as in paragraph (b).  In both paragraphs the same term was used and 
the same objective intended:  to allow contracting parties to impose trade re-
strictive measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue over-
riding public policy goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were una-
voidable”). 
66
 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶ 128 WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp Ap-
pellate Body Report], available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf. 
67
 Id. at ¶ 130. 
68
 See Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra 
note 58, at 20-21; Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, ¶¶ 5.242-5.252, 
WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (Aug. 7, 2014), available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/431_432_433abr_e.pdf. 
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measure with any other less trade-restrictive ‘reasonably 
available’ alternative. This contradictsthe WTO Member’s 
choice as to the level of protection it desires.69  However, con-
tradiction exists only if one presupposes that the WTO Mem-
ber’s choices are unbounded in the first place, and if one choos-
es to forget that GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV are 
also public policy calibration provisions by nature.  In develop-
ing these jurisprudential tests, however, what the Appellate 
Body and the Panels actually signal to WTO Members is that 
they will observe a measure of deference or respect for what a 
WTO Member identifies as its public policy objective or defines 
as its public policy priority in relation to the specific exception 
invoked in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. The Appel-
late Body and Panels do not deprive themselves of the power to 
scrutinize the design of the measure as it relates to the 
achievement of the public policy objective asserted by the WTO 
Member, and therefore, such deference or respect given to the 
GTO Members is not absolute.  There is nothing illogical about 
accepting that a WTO Member has chosen a particular public 
policy objective while also testing whether the challenged 
measure, as designed, is indeed tailored to meet the stated ob-
jective.  A WTO Member’s ‘desired level of protection’ of public 
health, environmental conservation, and other non-trade public 
policies is not synonymous with the means that the WTO 
Member may employ to reach that desired level of protection. 
A more pressing point of critique against the jurispruden-
tial tests set by the Appellate Body and the Panels is the amor-
phous nature of these legal tests, which has oscillated through-
out WTO jurisprudence. This oscillation with undisclosed 
reasons for the preferences between tests – between a “least 
trade restrictiveness,” a “reasonableness test,” a “proportionali-
ty test,” or some combination of these concepts – has proven 
more opaque than clear.70  The inconsistent legal tests may ac-
count for the difficulty WTO members experience in attempting 
                                                          
69
 Donald H. Regan, The meaning of ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and 
GATS Article XIV:  The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV 
3, 347, 369 (2007). 
70
 See Massimiliano Montini, The Necessity Principle as an Instrument to 
Balance Trade and the Protection of the Environment, 135,154,in 
ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Franceso Francioni 
ed., 2001). 
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to establish a successful defense under GATT Article XX or 
GATS Article XIV.  Most recently, the Appellate Body reversed 
the Panel’s findings in EU-Seal Products in regard to the cha-
peau requirements of GATT Article XX, “on the basis that the 
Panel applied an incorrect legal test.”71  The Appellate Body 
and the Panels could ensure better consistency in their inter-
pretive practices if there were fewer instances of judicial craft-
ing of what at this point ought to be settled criteria in the ap-
plication of the general exceptions to both treaties. Oscillation 
between various forms of tests and criteria does not lend any 
reassurance of predictability in interpretation – particularly if 
other as-yet untested specific exceptions in GATT Article XX 
and GATS Article XIV are invoked as defenses in the future. 
2. Balance of payments measures under Article XII and 
Article XVIII:B of GATT 1994 and Article XII:1 GATS 
WTO Members also retain regulatory freedom to imple-
ment ordinarily trade-restrictive measures to temporarily safe-
guard their external financial positions and/or to support the 
implementation of their economic development programs.  
GATT Article XII permits a Member to “restrict the quantity or 
value of merchandise permitted to be imported” in order to 
“safeguard its external financial position and its balance of 
payments”.72  Import restrictions under this provision should 
not exceed those necessary “to forestall the imminent threat of, 
or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves” or “in the 
case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to 
                                                          
71
 See European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products, supra note 56, at ¶ 6.1(d)(i); see Public Citi-
zen, Only One of 40 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV 
“General Exception” Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the WTO Exception 
Construct Will Not Provide for an Effective TPP General Exception, available 
at https://www.citizen.org/documents/general-exception.pdf (last accessed 
Mar. 12,, 2015). (Note that a citizens’ advocacy paper reports that the GATT 
Article XX defense “fails in 97 percent of cases.” As of this writing there has 
only been one occasion where a GATT Article XX exception was successfully 
established by a responding WTO Member and upheld by the Appellate 
Body); see Measuring Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
supra note 59, at ¶ 192(f)..   
72
 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 28, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
194, at art. XII(1).  
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achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves”.73  Mem-
bers implementing domestic policies under this provision 
should “pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring 
equilibrium in their balance of payments on a sound and last-
ing basis and to the desirability of avoiding an uneconomic em-
ployment of productive resources…it is desirable to adopt 
measures which expand rather than contract international 
trade.”74  Quantitative restrictions imposed under this provi-
sion are subject to limitations, as well as requirements of noti-
fication, consultation, and review.75 GATT Article XVIII:B (on 
Governmental Assistance to Economic Development) authoriz-
es similar import restrictions taken by a “contracting party, the 
economy of which can only support low standards of living and 
is in the early stages of development,”76 for the dual purposes of 
“safeguard[ing] its external financial position and to ensure a 
level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its pro-
gram of economic development.”77  The import restrictions au-
thorized under GATT Article XVIII:B are subject to similar no-
tification, consultation, and review requirements and 
limitations.78   
GATS Article XII:1 (Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance-
of-Payments), on the other hand, provides that “[i]n the event 
of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficul-
ties or threat thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain re-
                                                          
73
 Id. at art. XII:2(a). 
74
 Id. at art.XII:3(a). 
75
 Id. at art. XII:4-5. 
76
 Id. at art.XVIII:4(a); see also Interpretative Notes from Annex I Ad Ar-
ticle XVIII on paragraphs 1 and 4, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_03_e.htm (last accessed 
Mar. 12, 2015) (stating that “[w]hen they consider whether the economy of a 
contracting party ‘can only support low standards of living’, the Contracting 
Parties shall take into consideration the normal position of that economy and 
shall not base their determination on exceptional circumstances such as those 
which may result from the temporary existence of exceptionally favourable 
conditions for the staple export product or products of such contracting par-
ty”, and that the phrase ‘early stages of development’ is not meant to apply 
only to contracting parties which have just started their economic develop-
ment, but also to contracting parties the economies of which are undergoing a 
process of industrialization to correct an excessive dependence on primary 
production.”.) 
77
 Id. at art. XVIII:B(9). 
78
 See Marrakesh Agreement at art. XVIII:B(10)-(12). 
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strictions on trade in services for which it has undertaken spe-
cific commitments, including on payments or transfers for 
transactions related to such commitments.  It is recognized 
that particular pressures on the balance of payments of a 
Member in the process of economic development or economic 
transition may necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, in-
ter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves ade-
quate for the implementation of its program of economic devel-
opment or economic transition.”79  The permitted restrictions 
should not be discriminatory; should be consistent with the Ar-
ticles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; avoid 
unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial 
interests of any other Member; shall not exceed those neces-
sary to deal with the emergency; and be temporary and phased 
out progressively as the situation improves.80  Members can 
give priority to the supply of services that are “more essential 
to their economic or development programmes”, so long as the 
restrictions are not adopted or maintained to protect a particu-
lar service sector.81  The restrictions taken under GATS Article 
XII:1 are also subject to notification, consultation, and review 
procedures.82 
None of the foregoing balance-of-payments measures 
(quantitative or import restrictions as well as restrictions of 
trade in services) indicate a method for determining the ade-
quacy of reserves (or conversely, the scope and extent of re-
strictions) necessary for the Member’s economic development 
programming. The tribunal in India-Quantitative Restrictions 
partially addressed this matter.  In that case, India sought to 
justify quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural, tex-
tile and industrial products through Article XVIII:B of GATT 
1994.83  India argued that it was reasonable “to require a di-
rect, and therefore, clear and foreseeable causal link between 
the removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions and the re-
currence of balance-of-payments difficulties because the indi-
                                                          
79
 Id. at art. XII:1. 
80
 GATS, supra note 37, at Art. XII:2. 
81
 Id. at Art. XII:3 
82
 Id. at Art. XII:4 - XII:6.  
83
 Appellate Body Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of 
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999) 
[hereinafter “India-Quantitative Restrictions Appellate Body Report”]. 
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rect consequences of a removal of restrictions on the external 
financial position are difficult to trace and quantify;”84 accord-
ingly, it was erroneous for the WTO panel to have required In-
dia “to use macroeconomic and other development policy in-
struments to meet balance-of-payments problems caused by the 
immediate removal of its balance-of-payments restrictions.”85  
India maintained that the proviso to Article XVIII:11 of GATT 
1994 (e.g. “Provided that no contracting party shall be required 
to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change 
in its development policy would render unnecessary the re-
strictions which it is applying under this Section.”86) and the 
corresponding provision in Article XII:3(d)  
make it clear that the balance-of-payments provisions permit the 
imposition of restrictions, even if the Member has policy instru-
ments at its disposal that could render the restrictions unneces-
sary.  It is up to each Member to choose among those policy in-
struments, taking into account, not only the economic efficiency 
considerations on which the IMF bases its policy advice, but also 
its structural, institutional, and political constraints.”87  Accord-
ing to India, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) “never stat-
ed that India could remove all restrictions at once, maintain its 
existing policies, and face no balance-of-payments difficulties.88 
The Appellate Body rejected India’s contentions, finding, 
among others, that the IMF’s statement (e.g. that “the external 
situation can be managed using macro-economic policy instru-
ments alone…Quantitative restrictions (QRs) are not needed 
for balance-of-payments commitments and should be removed 
over a relatively short period of time…”89) did not imply any 
prescribed change in India’s development policy,90 since “the 
use of macroeconomic policy instruments is not related to any 
particular development policy, but is resorted to by all Mem-
bers regardless of the type of development policy they pur-
                                                          
84
 Id. at ¶ 33. 
85
 Id. at ¶ 34. 
86
 Id. at ¶ 111. 
87
 Id. at ¶ 35. 
88
 India – Quantitative Restrictions Appellate Body Report, supra note 86, 
at ¶ 37. 
89
 Id. at ¶ 123. 
90
 Id. at ¶ 130. 
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sue.”91  Thus, it would appear from India – Quantitative Re-
strictions that the Appellate Body gives determinative weight 
to IMF findings that a Member’s import restrictions are unnec-
essary to meet its balance-of-payments difficulties.  At present, 
there is no discernible method or legal criteria independently 
developed by the Appellate Body for ‘balancing’ the WTO Mem-
ber’s asserted objective of addressing a balance of payments 
emergency or implementing an economic development pro-
gram, with the WTO Member’s quantitative restrictions. 
2. SPS measures in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement 
The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)92 regulates WTO 
Members’ measures for protecting human, animal or plant life 
or health from certain risks.  An SPS measure is any measure 
that is applied: 
“(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory 
of the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment 
or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or dis-
ease-causing organisms; 
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory 
of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs; 
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, 
plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests; or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the 
Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests. 
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, 
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, in-
ter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; 
testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; quar-
                                                          
91
 Id. at ¶ 126. 
92
 The WTO Agreement 1994, WTO Agreement on the Application of San-
itary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 493, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (last accessed Mar 
12, 2015) (hereinafter “SPS Agreement”). 
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antine treatments including relevant requirements associated 
with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials 
necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on rele-
vant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of 
risk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements di-
rectly related to food safety.”93 
SPS measures, in essence, illustrate the WTO Member’s 
freedom to regulate to safeguard public health concerns.  Arti-
cle 2.2 of the SPS Agreement explicitly obligates Members to 
“ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not main-
tained without sufficient scientific evidence,”94 and where such 
measures conform to the SPS Agreement, they are “presumed 
to be in accordance with the obligations of the Members under 
the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Arti-
cle XX(b).”95  SPS measures have to be based on an “assess-
ment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to hu-
man, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk 
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations.”96 With respect to sources of information for the 
assessment of risks, the Members should “take into account 
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production 
methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; 
prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest – or 
disease – free areas; relevant ecological and environmental 
conditions; and quarantine or other treatment.”97  When as-
sessing the Member’s SPS measure in relation to the risk to an-
imal or plant life or health and the appropriate level of sanitary 
or phytosanitary protection from such risk, Member “shall take 
into account as relevant economic factors: the potential damage 
in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, 
establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control 
or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and 
the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to lim-
                                                          
93
 Id. at Annex A, § 1. 
94
 Id. at Art. 2.2. 
95
 Id. at Art. 2.4. 
96
 Id. at Art. 5.1. 
97
 Id.at Art. 5.2. 
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iting risks.”98 
WTO jurisprudence has not yet articulated the legal test 
for determining how an SPS measure is “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health” under Article 2.2 of the 
SPS Agreement, although it has been observed that Article 5.6 
of the SPS Agreement builds on Article 2.2.99  Article 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement states: 
“Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing 
or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve 
the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
Measures shall ensure that such measures are not more trade re-
strictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sani-
tary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical 
and economic feasibility.”100 
The footnote to Article 5.6 states that “[f]or purpose of par-
agraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more trade-restrictive 
than required unless there is another measure, reasonably 
available taking into account technical and economic feasibil-
ity, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosan-
itary protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade.”101  
The Appellate Body affirmed the interpretation of this footnote 
by the WTO panel in Australia-Salmon as the basis for a cumu-
lative test of the reasonableness of an alternative measure:  1) 
the alternative measure should be “reasonably available taking 
into account technical and economic feasibility”; 2) it should 
“achieve the Member’s appropriate level of sanitary and phyto-
sanitary protection”; and 3) is “significantly less restrictive to 
trade than the sanitary measure contested”.102  The characteri-
zation of “reasonableness” in the first element of the test, tak-
ing into account “technical and economic feasibility”, as well as 
the determination of “appropriateness” of the level of SPS pro-
tection sought by the Member in the third element, has not, as 
yet, been subjected by the Appellate Body or Panels to any sub-
stantive criteria. 
                                                          
98
 SPS Agreement, supra note 95, at art. 5.3. 
99
 Van Den Bossche and Zdouc, supra note 47, at 905, 923-26. 
100
 SPS Agreement, supra note 95, at art. 5.6. 
101
 Id. at art. 5.6, n. 3 (emphasis added). 
102
 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, ¶ 194, WT/DS18/AB/R (Nov. 6 1998). 
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2. Technical regulations under Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement 
States also retain regulatory freedom to impose technical 
regulations for legitimate public policy objectives.  The Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) regu-
lates WTO Members’ technical regulations, defined as a “doc-
ument which lays down product characteristics or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandato-
ry.  It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they 
apply to a product, process or production method.”103  According 
to the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos, product characteristics 
“include, not only features and qualities intrinsic to the product 
itself, but also related ‘characteristics’, such as the means of 
identification, the presentation and the appearance of a prod-
uct”;104 compliance with product characteristics is “mandato-
ry”;105 and the technical regulation should apply to an identifi-
able product or group of products.106 Article 2.1. of the TBT 
Agreement indicates the non-discrimination requirements for 
technical regulations,107 while Article 2.2 of the TBT Agree-
ment regulates WTO Members’ technical regulations in rela-
tion to their legitimate public objectives: 
“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of cre-
ating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For this pur-
pose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive 
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of 
the risks non-fulfillment would create.  Such legitimate objectives 
                                                          
103
 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal In-
struments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm (last accessed  Mar. 
12, 2015), at Annex 1, paragraph 1. [hereinafter, “TBT Agreement”]. 
104
 EC-Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 59, at para. 67. 
105
 Id. at ¶ 68. 
106
 Id. at ¶ 70. 
107
 TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at Art. 2.1 (“Members shall ensure 
that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory 
of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that ac-
corded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in 
any other country.”). 
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are, inter alia:  national security requirements; the prevention of 
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal 
or plant life or health, or the environment.  In assessing such 
risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available 
scientific and technical information, related processing technolo-
gy or intended end-uses of products.”108 
Technical regulations are not of an indefinite duration – 
they should not be maintained “if the circumstances or objec-
tives giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the 
changed circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less 
trade-restrictive manner.”109  Unlike the explicit provision in 
Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement, compliance with the TBT 
Agreement does not give rise to a presumption that a technical 
barrier to trade is also consistent with GATT rules.110 The Ap-
pellate Body in US – Clove Cigarettes stressed that the “object 
and purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike a balance be-
tween, on the one hand, the objective of trade liberalization 
and, on the other hand, Member’s right to regulate….Article 
2.1. should not be interpreted as prohibiting any detrimental 
impact on competitive opportunities for imports in cases where 
such detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from le-
gitimate regulatory distinctions.”111  To determine whether the 
detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a regula-
tory distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against 
the group of imported products, the Appellate Body mandated 
panels to “carefully scrutinize the particular circumstances of 
the case, that is, the design, architecture, revealing structure, 
                                                          
108
 TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at Art. 2.2 (emphasis added); see also 
Simon Lester and William Stemberg, The GATT Origins of TBT Agreement 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2, 17 J. INT’L ECON L. 1, 215-32 (2014) (commenting on the 
normative genealogy of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement from GATT). 
109
 TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at Art. 2.3. 
110
 Christine Wolff, Regulating Trade in GMOs: Biotechnology and the 
WTO, in TRADING IN GENES: DEVELOPMENT PERSCPETIVES ON BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 217, 217-34 (2005) (“The relationship between the 
TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994 is less clear.  In the preamble, WTO 
Members state their desire to further the objective of GATT 1994, but there is 
no presumption of consistency with GATT for measures that comply with the 
TBT Agreement.”). 
111
 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Production and 
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 174, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter 
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report]. 
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operation, and application of the technical regulation at issue, 
and, in particular, whether that technical regulation is even-
handed, in order to determine whether it discriminates against 
the group of imported products.”112  As such, the particular 
cause of the detrimental impact is significant for purposes of 
establishing a violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement – if 
the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a “legitimate 
regulatory distinction” then there is no such violation.113  How-
ever, it should also be borne in mind that for detrimental im-
pacts from regulatory distinctions to be “legitimate”, such dis-
tinctions must be applied in an even-handed manner, as 
stressed by the Appellate Body in US – COOL: “where a regu-
latory distinction is not designed and applied in an even-
handed manner – because, for example, it is designed or ap-
plied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination – that distinction cannot be consid-
ered ‘legitimate’, and thus the detrimental impact will reflect 
discrimination prohibited under Article 2.1.”114  The even-
handedness of a legitimate regulatory distinction can be shown 
from the manner by which the challenged technical regulation 
responds to the public risks subject of the regulatory distinc-
tion.115   
2. Article 8.1 in relation to Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement 
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement defines the balancing ob-
jectives of the Agreement which states:  “The protection and 
                                                          
112
 Id. at ¶ 182.  
113
 Id. at ¶ 216.  
114
 Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements, ¶ 271, WT/DS384/AB/R (June 29, 2012).  
115
 Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 297, WT/DS381/AB/R 
(May 16, 2012) (“…we conclude that the United States has not demonstrated 
that the difference in labeling conditions for tuna products containing tuna 
caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna 
products containing tuna caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP, 
on the other hand, is ‘calibrated’ to the risks to dolphins arising from differ-
ent fishing methods in different areas of the ocean.  It follows from this that 
the United States has not demonstrated that the detrimental impact of the 
US measure on Mexican tuna products stems exclusively from a legitimate 
regulatory distinction…”) [hereinafter US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body 
Report]. 
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enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a man-
ner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance 
of rights and obligations.”116 Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment provides that “Members may, in formulating or amending 
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest 
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and tech-
nological development, provided that such measures are con-
sistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”117  Article 8.1 in 
relation to Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement has not yet been 
squarely adjudicated or interpreted by the Appellate Body, but 
these provisions were repeatedly referred to in Canada – Pa-
tent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products to demonstrate the 
“public interest” dimension of TRIPS that could assist in inter-
preting exceptions under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.118  
Read alongside Article 7, Article 8.1 does not appear to create 
the effect of an exception under the TRIPS Agreement, but ra-
ther operates as a principle that affirms that Members’ domes-
tic measures can protect specific public interests in ways that 
do not violate the TRIPS Agreement.119As can be seen from the 
plain texts of Articles 7 and 8.1, what is contemplated from 
Members’ domestic actions or measures that vindicate public 
                                                          
116
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 7, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement].  
117
 Id. at art. 8.1. 
118
 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
¶ 4.10(d), 4.30(a), WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).  
119
 See Sisule F. Musungu, The Trips Agreement and Public Health, in 
431 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 421-70 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2008) (“Article 8 therefore 
expressly grants permission to WTO Members to introduce measures that are 
necessary to protect public health among other public policy objectives includ-
ing measures to prevent the abuse of the exclusive rights conferred by pa-
tents and to foster innovation and R&D as well as the transfer of technology 
in the pharmaceutical sector…Article 8 should be read as establishing the 
primacy of public health considerations, both in terms of innovation, R&D, 
and transfer of technology and access to medicines in the formulation and 
amendment of laws to implement TRIPS.”). 
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values is a balancing with other values protected under the 
TRIPS Agreement, such as innovation, research and develop-
ment.  The concluding proviso within Article 8.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement explicitly requires that the Member’s domestic 
measures taken for public interest protection be “consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement.”  It was for this reason 
that Canada did not directly invoke Article 8.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement as an independent defense in Canada – Patent Pro-
tection of Pharmaceutical Products, but merely as a contextual 
principle to emphasize that public health and public interest 
values form part of the spectrum of values that ought to inform 
the interpretation of exceptions to patents authorized under 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.120  At best, Article 8.1 of 
the TRIPS Agreement has been argued to have an evidentiary 
effect of a presumption of consistency with TRIPS: 
“The constraint in Article 8.1, as it was finally adopted, is that 
the measures they adopt should not violate the terms of the 
agreement.  The UNCTAD IPRs Resource Book suggests that 
‘measures adopted by Members to address public health, nutri-
tion and matters of vital socio-economic importance should be 
presumed to be consistent with TRIPS, and that any Member 
seeking to challenge the exercise of discretion should bear the bur-
den of proving inconsistency….This approach presumes that the 
sequence of examination begins with whether the measures are 
of the kind envisioned, and if they are, then it goes on to address 
the issue of whether they are inconsistent…Under such an ap-
proach, there therefore exists a difference in scope between Arti-
cle 30 and Article 8.  Thus, where a measure is aimed specifically 
to ‘protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development’ then Article 8 would create a pre-
sumption that the measure is consistent, which must be rebutted 
by the complainant…Article 8 would thus shift the burden for 
public interest measures whereas all other measures would be 
directly addressed by Articles 30 and 31…This approach however 
only allows Article 8.1 to have a burden shifting role in certain 
situations….[it] does not negate the fact that compliance with Ar-
                                                          
120
 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 119, at art. 30. (“Members may provide 
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of a 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the pa-
tent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”). 
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ticle 8.1 would remain dependent on either not violating a right 
granted by a provision or by coming within the boundaries of an 
exception or limitation enumerated elsewhere in the TRIPS 
Agreement.  There would still be no substantive effect to the first 
half of Article 8.1.”121 
Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement requires the Member 
to establish that the challenged measure meet two elements: 
first, that the measure is indeed necessary to promote the pub-
lic interest in sectors of vital importance; and second, that the 
measure remains consistent with TRIPS.122  Whether the Ap-
pellate Body and Panels will propose the “reasonableness” or 
“rational relationship” tests between the objective of promoting 
public interest and the TRIPS-consistency of the challenged 
measure remains a matter to be anticipated. 
2. PROVISIONS ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
(S&D)  
There are numerous provisions on special and differential 
treatment (S&D) for developing countries and least developed 
countries (LDCs) in the WTO agreements, but to date none of 
them have been interpreted in a concrete WTO dispute.  While 
SDT provisions are known to afford a degree of flexibility for 
developing countries and LDCs, the WTO Appellate Body and 
panels have not yet had an occasion to interpret these provi-
sions, whether as positive obligations, as some form of interpre-
tive defense when a developing country or LDC imposes ordi-
narily trade-restrictive measures, or as a deferential or flexible 
standard of review.123  The 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference 
                                                          
121
 Dalindyebo Shabalala, Challenges for Technology Transfer in the Cli-
mate Change Arena: What Interactions with the TRIPS Agreement in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK  ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 507, 530-31 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).   
122
 See PING XIONG, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  AN INTERPRETATION 
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 153-54 (Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012).  
123
 The argument has been made that the S&D principle could operate as 
a “broader principle” for interpreting obligations under the WTO agreements, 
as well as in relation to the inherent jurisdiction of the Appellate Body with 
respect to procedural aspects of dispute settlement. Andrew D. Mitchell, A 
Legal Principle of Special and Differential Treatment for WTO Disputes, 5 
WORLD TRADE REV. 3, 445-69 (2006). See also Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special 
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in Doha declared that provisions for special and differential 
treatment are an “integral part of the WTO Agreements”, and 
in turn, ordered the review of such provisions “with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective 
and operational”.124  The WTO Secretariat has since conducted 
a comprehensive review of the S&D provisions throughout the 
WTO agreements and the decisions of the WTO political or-
gans.125  S&D provisions were classified according to six catego-
ries:  1) provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities 
of developing country Members; 2) provisions under which 
WTO Members should safeguard the interests of developing 
country Members; 3) flexibility of commitments, of action, and 
use of policy instruments; 4) transitional time periods; 5) tech-
nical assistance; and 6) provisions relating to least developed 
country (LDC) Members.126  A developing country or LDC 
Member’s obligations as a State Party to the ICESCR can help 
substantiate and provide fuller information on how a Member 
could fall well within the standards that often trigger S&D 
flexibility, such as “economic development programming needs” 
in the balance-of-payments provisions previously discussed un-
der GATT Article XVIII:B.  In GATT Article XVIII:7(a), a 
Member can seek negotiations to modify or withdraw conces-
sions “in order to promote the establishment of a particular in-
dustry with a view to raising the general standard of living of 
                                                                                                                                  
and Differential Treatment, 27 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291-317 (2004). 
124
 World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration of 20 No-
vember 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶ 4. See also Decision Adopted by the 
General Council of 1 August 2004, WT/l/579, ¶ 1 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm#
sd (instructing the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session 
to “expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding Agreement-
specific proposals and report to the General Council, with clear recommenda-
tions for a decision, by July 2005. The Council further instructs the Commit-
tee, within the parameters of the Doha mandate, to address all other out-
standing work, including on the cross-cutting issues, the monitoring 
mechanism and the incorporation of S&D treatment into the architecture of 
WTO rules, as referred to in TN/CTD/7 and report, as appropriate, to the 
General Council.”). 
125
 Committee on Trade and Development, Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions: Note by the Secre-
tariat, WT/COMTD/W/196 (June 14, 2013) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisio
ns_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Secretariat SDT Note]. 
126
 Id. at 3-4.  
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its people”.127  No legal criteria or jurisprudential tests have 
been developed to date as to the S&D provisions. 
As seen from the foregoing, the DSU’s adoption of the Ap-
pellate Body and Panel Reports indicates that interpretive de-
velopment of public policy calibration provisions result in dif-
ferent approaches to balancing trade and non-trade public 
policies.  Much depends on what public policy provisions a re-
sponding WTO Member invokes at the DSU in responding to a 
fellow WTO Member’s complaint.  As far as general exceptions 
under GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV are concerned, 
such provisions have not been empirically proven as realistical-
ly successful defenses for responding WTO Members.  While 
the Appellate Body and Panels are generally conscious of the 
importance of balancing, the proliferation of jurisprudential 
tests to undertake balancing makes it difficult and unpredicta-
ble to rely on public policy calibration provisions in the WTO 
agreements as legal defenses. 
A. Public Policy in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM) 
A 2007 study averred that the contemporary political pro-
cesses of negotiations, trade policy reviews, and WTO waiver 
decisions and Ministerial Conference discussions and practices 
already reflect the reality that “WTO members increasingly 
                                                          
127
 GATT, supra note 37, at art. XVIII:7 (“If a contracting party coming 
within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article considers it desirable, in 
order to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to 
raising the general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a 
concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, 
it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this effect and enter into ne-
gotiations with any contracting party with which such concession was initial-
ly negotiated, and with any other contracting party determined by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest therein. If agree-
ment is reached between such contracting parties concerned, they shall be 
free to modify or withdraw concessions under the appropriate Schedules to 
this Agreement in order to give effect to such agreement, including any com-
pensatory adjustments involved.”).  See id. at art. XVIII:13 (“If a contracting 
party coming within the scope of paragraph 4(a) of this Article finds that gov-
ernmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular 
industry with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people, 
but that no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement is 
practicable to achieve that objective, it may have recourse to the provisions 
and procedures set out in this Section.”). 
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seek to reconcile their trade and human rights objectives,”128 in 
particular revealing that: 1) accession applications frequently 
include questions on rule of law and the compliance with hu-
man rights by the applicant States;129 2) the WTO had already 
issued its first waiver specifically to protect human rights, e.g. 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to prevent trading 
in conflict diamonds;130 3) human rights concerns were increas-
ingly being litigated in the dispute settlement system through 
GATT Article XX exceptions;131 4) trade policy reviews conduct-
ed by the TPRB systematically engage questions of social and 
environmental impacts of, and human rights considerations in, 
Member States’ trade policies;132 and 5) trade negotiations un-
der the Doha Round increasingly reflect the prioritization of 
human rights obligations as the premise of the global develop-
ment agenda.133  Other scholars confirm various aspects of this 
evolving phenomenon to accommodate and coordinate human 
rights in the political organs and processes of the WTO sys-
tem.134 
The TPRM remains a work in progress as to systematically 
obtaining information relating to trade and non-trade public 
policies of WTO Members.  The TPRM is a dialogic process be-
tween the WTO and its individual Members, involving an as-
sessment of the latters domestic trade policies in relation to 
WTO commitments.  Its declared purpose is  
to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, dis-
ciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements, and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade 
                                                          
128
 Susan Ariel Aaronson, Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Con-
cerns are Penetrating the WTO, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 3, 1-37 (2007). 
129
 Id. at 12-15.  
130
 Id. at 16. 
131
 Id. at 18-22. 
132
 Id. at 22-26. 
133
 Id. at 27-32. 
134
 See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Effective Implementation of Inter-
secting Public International Law Regimes:  Environment, Development, and 
Trade Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TOWARDS 
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 213-58 (Ashgate 2009); Christopher Butler, 
Comment, Human Rights and the World Trade Organization: The Right to 
Essential Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement, 5 U. PA. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 
(2007); Abadir M. Ibrahim, International Trade and Human Rights: An Un-
finished Debate, 14 GERMAN L.J. 321, 334-36 (2013). 
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Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multi-
lateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and 
understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.  
Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective 
appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual Mem-
bers’ trade policies and practices and their impact on the func-
tioning of the multilateral trading system.  It is not, however, in-
tended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific 
obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement pro-
cedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members.”135   
While the assessment in the TPRM takes into considera-
tion “the background of the wider economic and developmental 
needs, policies and objectives of the Member concerned, as well 
as of its external environment,” its main function is “to exam-
ine the impact of a Member’s trade policies and practices on the 
multilateral trading system.”136  On the other hand, the Trade 
Policy Review Body (TPRB) of the WTO conducts the pro-
gramme of reviews and actual sessions of review.137  Despite 
the breadth of the subject-matter that could be covered under 
the TPRM, considering the “developmental needs, policies, and 
objectives of the Member concerned, these policies are not 
evaluated as to their impact on human rights or compliance 
with other international commitments.  Democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and the protection of labour rights have 
generally been overlooked, although there recently have been 
references to ‘social stability.’”138 
Recent trade policy review reports written by the WTO 
Secretariat do reflect some institutional awareness of the im-
pacts of trade policies on income inequalities and social protec-
tion. However, the trade policy reviews still do not require any 
disclosure by the WTO Member of its international social pro-
tection commitments and the status of its compliance with such 
                                                          
135
 Trade Policy Review Mechanism ¶ A(i), Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available 
at http://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/ 
tprm_01_e.htm. 
136
 Id. at ¶ A(ii). 
137
 See M. Benzing, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in WOLFRUM, STOLL, 
& KAISER 619-34 (2006) (explaining trade policy review sessions conducted by 
the TPRB). 
138
 MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 750 (Routledge, 4th ed. 2013). 
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commitments. For example, as reflected under the Internation-
al Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the dis-
closure of WTO Members’ international obligations, such as the 
rights to work, favourable conditions of work, and the enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of health, social securi-
ty, and education are not required. The WTO Secretariat Re-
port for the Second Trade Policy Review of Panama, a State 
Party to the ICESCR,139 specifically noted that 
there remain considerable social and regional inequalities and a 
significant shortage of skilled labour… It would also be wise to 
reassess, and where appropriate, rationalize the incentive 
schemes in order to narrow the gap between the most vigorous 
economic zones and sectors and the rest of the economy, and to 
allocate more resources to social programmes, including im-
provements in the quality of education in order to meet the de-
mand for skilled labour on which sustainable economic growth 
depends.140   
The same report also noted Panama’s environmental com-
mitments in other treaties such as the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity.141 On the 
other hand, Brazil’s Sixth Trade Policy Review reported that 
its sustained economic growth from trade enabled it to reduce 
poverty and income inequality.142 The WTO Secretariat report 
for the fifth Trade Policy Review of China143 referred to China’s 
domestic measures to protect state security, public morals, en-
vironmental concerns, and international commitments, but 
made no specific mention of China’s duties as a State Party to 
the ICESCR. Amongst many duties, China must: 
                                                          
139
 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter ICESCR].  
140
 Secretariat Report, Second Trade Policy Review of Panama, ¶ 2, 
WT/TPR/S/301 (June 18, 2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s301_e.pdf. 
141
 Id. at ¶ 3.139.  
142
 Secretariat Report, Sixth Trade Policy Review of Brazil, ¶ 3, 
WT/TPR/S/283 (May 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s283_e.pdf.  Brazil acceded to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on January 
24, 1992. See generally ICESCR, supra note 142. 
143
 China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights on March 27, 2001.  See generally ICESCR, supra note 142. 
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Import licensing, restrictions and prohibitions are maintained on 
grounds of state security; public morality, human, animal and 
plant health; environmental protection; balance of payment rea-
sons; and to comply with international commitments.  China uses 
both automatic and non-automatic licensing.  Goods subject to 
any of the restrictions are listed in Catalogues issued by the rele-
vant agencies.  However, these lists can be adjusted as necessary, 
and imports of goods that are not included in the Catalogue can 
be restricted or prohibited on a temporary basis by the relevant 
authorities.144   
Likewise, India145 indicated that its import restrictions 
may be imposed on the grounds of  
health, safety, moral and security reasons, and for self-sufficiency 
and balance-of-payments reasons.  On occasion, India links the 
use of trade policy instruments to domestic policy considerations.  
For instance, import restrictions and licensing requirements are 
relaxed when imports are necessary to alleviate inflation or sup-
ply shortages.  State trading is also used as a policy tool to en-
sure, inter alia, a ‘fair’ return to farmers, food security, the sup-
ply of fertilizer to farmers, and the functioning of the domestic 
price support system…India grants direct and indirect assistance 
to various sectors…the states also provide additional subsidies, 
especially for basic services such as education and health, elec-
tricity, and water.  Price controls, which apply to some commodi-
ties, are aimed at providing subsidies to farmers and a popula-
tion under the poverty line, and to ensure ‘reasonable price’ of 
quality drugs.146   
Indonesia147 also cites similar reasons as grounds for the 
authority of the Ministry of Trade to prohibit exports: “a na-
tional security or public interest threat (including social, cul-
tural and moral reasons); protection of intellectual property 
rights; protection of human life and health; protection of the 
environment and ecology; and signature and ratification of in-
                                                          
144
 Secretariat Report, Fifth Trade Policy Review of China, ¶ 19, 
WT/TPR/S/300 (May 27, 2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s300_e.pdf. 
145
 India acceded to the ICESCR on April 10, 1979.  See generally 
ICESCR, supra note 142. 
146
 Secretariat Report, Fifth Trade Policy Review of India, ¶3, 5, 
WT/TPR/S/249 (Aug. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp349_e.htm.  
147
 Indonesia acceded to the ICESCR on 23 February 2006.  See generally 
ICESCR, supra note 142.   
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ternational treaties or agreements by the Government.”148  
None of these reports, however, articulate the WTO Member’s 
continuing duties as a State Party to the ICESCR, and the sta-
tus of social protection in their respective countries where they 
report in the periodic review before the Committee on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Arguably, the European Union demonstrates the most re-
markable trade policy review practices in regard to reflecting 
economic, social and cultural rights as part of its trade policy-
making. The European Union stressed that its trade policy “is 
required to address developmental, environmental, and social 
objectives, and contribute to the objectives set out in the Treaty 
on the European Union, including development and consolida-
tion of democracy and the rule of law, and respect of human 
rights”,149 and for this reason the European Commission 
carries out impact-assessment analysis to support its decision-
making for all proposals with significant direct impact, including 
in the trade policy area.  The impact-assessment process assesses 
different policy options by comparing both potential benefits and 
costs in economic, social and environmental terms.  The system 
relies on stakeholder consultations, and impact-assessment re-
ports are published once the Commission’s decision has been tak-
en.  In the case of trade negotiations, the Commission carries out 
‘trade sustainability impact assessments’ (SIAs) to analyze the 
economic, environmental and social impact of the EU trade 
agreements for the EU and its trading partners.  SIAs inform ne-
gotiations and are independent studies conducted by external 
consultants, involving comprehensive consultation of stakehold-
ers to ensure a high degree of transparency and taking account of 
the knowledge and concerns of relevant interest groups both in 
the EU and in the trading partner.  The Commission is commit-
ted to better assessing the impact of trade initiative including 
carrying out ex-post analysis of agreement implementation.150   
In contrast, other major players in the trading system do 
not appear to have taken a similar route of embedding human 
                                                          
148
 Secretariat Report, Sixth Trade Policy Review of Indonesia, ¶ 3.77, 
WT/TPR/S/278 (Mar. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s278_e.pdf. 
149
 Secretariat Report, Eleventh Trade Policy Review of the European Un-
ion, ¶ 2.12, WT/TPR/S/284 (May 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s284_e.pdf.  
150
 Id. at ¶ 2.15. 
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rights compliance in trade policy reviews.  The most recent 
Trade Policy Review for the United States (a signatory but not 
a State Party to the ICESCR), the Trade Policy Review for Ja-
pan (a State Party to the ICESCR), and the Trade Policy Re-
view for Canada, all did not indicate any impacts of trade poli-
cies, and are virtually silent on issues of domestic income 
inequality, as well as social and environmental protection.151 
The ultimate effectiveness of the WTO’s TPRM as a sur-
veillance mechanism as a “managerial”, “compliance pull”, or 
“peer review” process152 depends on the extent to which the 
process is used by the WTO Members to fully unveil critical is-
sues in the public policy objectives behind their regulatory 
measures.  Apart from the examining the technical require-
ments of trade commitments in the WTO agreements, WTO 
Members who are States Parties to the ICESCR could them-
selves initiate the periodic dialogue with the WTO on the very 
same public policies that undergird their exercise of regulatory 
freedom. 
A. Public Policy in WTO Trade Negotiations 
Where the WTO Member who is, for example, also one of 
the 162 State Parties to the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), cannot avail of 
the legal calibration afforded by broad provisions in the WTO 
agreements that affirm regulatory freedom to protect public 
policies, it is not prohibited from seeking to obtain such flexibil-
ity in complying with trade commitments through decisions of 
the WTO political organs. 153  The Ministerial Conference of the 
                                                          
151
 See Secretariat Report, Eleventh Trade Policy Review of the United 
States, WT/TPR/S/275 (Nov. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp375_e.htm; Secretariat Report, 
Eleventh Trade Policy Review of Japan, WT/TPR/S/276 (Jan. 15, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp376_e.htm; Secretariat 
Report, Trade Policy Review of Canada, WT/TPR/S/246 (May 4, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp346_e.htm.  
152
 See SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION:  A 
REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 160-61 (2003) (“Although 
the TPRM, in carrying out these policy reviews, engages in the evaluation of 
Member’s regulations and policies for ‘consistency’ with the WTO system, it is 
a managerial, rather than ‘enforcement’ mechanism.  In other words, it 
amounts to a ‘peer review’ process.”). 
153
 See Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO 
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WTO – the institution’s supreme decision-making body – has 
the power to adopt authoritative interpretations under Article 
IX:2 of the WTO Agreement,154 the power to adopt amendment 
decisions under Article X:1 of the WTO Agreement,155 and the 
power to issue waivers of WTO commitments under Article 
IX:3 of the WTO Agreement.156 
                                                                                                                                  
for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 615, 618 (2009), available at 
http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=1853&issue=92 [hereinafter Feichtner 
EJIL 2009].  
154
 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 28, at art. IX:2 (“The Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to 
adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements.  In the case of an interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agree-
ment in Annex 1, they shall exercise their authority on the basis of a recom-
mendation by the Council overseeing the functioning of that Agreement.  The 
decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority 
of the Members.  This paragraph shall not be used in a manner that would 
undermine the amendment provisions in Article X.”). 
155
 Id. at art. X:1 (“Any Member of the WTO may initiate a proposal to 
amend the provisions of this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments in Annex 1 by submitting such proposal to the Ministerial Conference.  
The Councils listed in paragraph 5 of Article IV may also submit to the Min-
isterial Conference proposals to amend the provisions of the corresponding 
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1 the functioning of which they 
oversee.  Unless the Ministerial Conference decides on a longer period, for a 
period of 90 days after the proposal has been tabled formally at the Ministe-
rial Conference any decision taken by the Ministerial Conference to submit 
the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance shall be taken by 
consensus.  Unless the provisions of paragraphs 2, 5, or 6 apply, that decision 
shall specify whether the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 4 shall apply.  If con-
sensus is reached, the Ministerial Conference shall forthwith submit the pro-
posed amendment to the Members for acceptance.  If consensus is not 
reached at a meeting of the Ministerial Conference within the established pe-
riod, the Ministerial Conference shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the 
Members whether to submit the proposed amendment to the Members for ac-
ceptance.  Except as provided in paragraphs 2, 5 and 6, the provisions of par-
agraph 3 shall apply to the proposed amendment, unless the Ministerial Con-
ference decides by a three-fourths majority of the Members that the 
provisions of paragraph 4 shall apply.”). 
156
 Id. at art. IX:3 (“In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Confer-
ence may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agree-
ment or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, provided that any such 
decision shall be taken by three fourths of the Members unless otherwise 
provided for in this paragraph.  (a) A request for a waiver concerning this 
Agreement shall be submitted to the Ministerial Conference for consideration 
pursuant to the practice of decision-making by consensus.  The Ministerial 
Conference shall establish a time-period, which shall not exceed 90 days, to 
consider the request.  If consensus is not reached during the time-period, any 
decision to grant a waiver shall be taken by three fourths of the Members.  (b) 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:41 PM 
2015] BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY 597 
The power to adopt authoritative interpretations of the 
WTO covered agreements lies exclusively with the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council.157  While there have been 
attempts to invoke this power,158 to date the required vote has 
not yet been obtained for the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council to adopt an authoritative interpretation of any 
provision of the WTO covered agreements, partly owing to the 
difficulties of mustering the required three-fourths majority to 
enact such an authoritative interpretation, the fact that Mem-
bers have been able to operate within the WTO system (espe-
cially the Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU) without 
having to resort to rallying political machinery at the Ministe-
rial Conference to muster the required vote, and also out of re-
luctance due to the uncertain consequences of an authoritative 
interpretation on dispute settlement.159  Accordingly, while 
on sheer numbers alone WTO Members who are States 
Parties to the ICESCR might well be able to muster the 
required three-fourths majority to obtain authoritative in-
terpretations of WTO provisions that may implicate their 
ICESCR obligations,160 it may not be necessarily the prudent 
decision for them to do so, given the ripple consequences of an 
                                                                                                                                  
A request for a waiver concerning the Multilateral Trade Agreements in An-
nexes 1A or 1B or 1C and their annexes shall be submitted initially to the 
Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services or the Council 
for TRIPS, respectively, for consideration during a time-period which shall 
not exceed 90 days.  At the end of the time-period, the relevant Council shall 
submit a report to the Ministerial Conference.”). 
157
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of 
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, ¶ 19-20, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 
1997), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds33_e.htm.  
158
 See Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article 
IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement of the World Trade Organization, 
WT/GC/W/133 (Jan. 25, 1999) (commenting on the interpretation of Articles 
3.7, 21.5, 22.2, 22.6, 22.7, and 23 of the DSU).   
159
 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative In-
terpretation under Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 4, 803-24 (2005). DIANE A. DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE ICESCR IN TRADE, FINANCE, AND 
INVESTMENT 242 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015).  
160
 See Caroline Dommen, Safeguarding the Legitimacy of the Multilat-
eral Trading System:  The Role of Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 121, 131 
(Frederick M. Abbott, Christine Kaufmann, Thomas Cottier eds., 2006).  
49
3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:41 PM 
598 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::2 
authoritative interpretation of WTO provisions throughout the 
entire system, especially on pending and future WTO dis-
putes.161   
For similar reasons, political support for an amendment 
any of the WTO covered agreements may be difficult to ob-
tain.162  In practice, taking decisions by voting at the WTO – 
instead of the usual consensus decision-making process163 – 
rarely occurs in the WTO system.164  The first amendment pro-
posed and recommended for a WTO covered agreement is the 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement that would make the 
2003 waiver decision165 for essential medicines permanent and 
built into the TRIPS Agreement.166 WTO Members have a 
deadline of 31 December 2015 to have a two-thirds majority 
approve the amendment.167  For Members that formally accept 
                                                          
161
 See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW:  HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) (“…If, in the authoritative interpreta-
tion, both disputing parties agree to change the law retroactively so as to ap-
ply it also to their dispute, the judicial decision, in so far as it relies on the old 
law, would lose its practical effect:  if the complainant had won the dispute on 
the basis of the ‘old law’, that party, having agreed to the ‘new law’, would no 
longer seek…the implementation of the judicial decision; if, in contrast, the 
defendant had won the original dispute, the complainant would need to seek 
a new panel decision for it to see the ‘new law’ applied to its case…”). 
162
 See William J. Davey, Institutional Framework, in THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION:  LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 51, 70 (Patrick F.J. 
Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton & Michael G. Plummer eds., 2007).  
163
 MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 12  (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2006) (“…consensus differs from unanimity.  In consensus deci-
sion-making, the minority will normally go along with the majority unless it 
has a serious objection.  The majority will, in turn, not ramrod decisions 
through by vote but will deal with the objections of the minority.  The consen-
sus decision-making process takes a great deal of time.  Voting occurs in the 
WTO only when a decision cannot be taken by consensus.  In the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council, decisions are taken by ‘a majority of the 
votes cast’ unless otherwise specified in the relevant WTO agreement.  Each 
Member has one vote…”). 
164
 See VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 47, at 142. 
165
 See General Council Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 
(Sept. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. 
166
 See General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, 
WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.   
167
 See General Council Decision, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – 
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the amendment, they will take effect and replace the 2003 
waiver decision for those Members.  For the remaining mem-
bers that do not accept the amendment, the waiver will contin-
ue to apply until the Member accepts the amendment and it 
takes effect.168 
Finally, WTO Members who are States Parties to the 
ICESCR may also seek to fulfill duties to respect, protect, and 
fulfill ICESCR rights through methods of international cooper-
ation, by mustering the required three-fourths majority of the 
Members to wield the waiver decision powers of the Ministerial 
Conference.  Some of the more recent waiver decisions of the 
Ministerial Conference include the December 14, 2001 Waiver 
Decision on the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific states)-
EC (European Communities) Partnership Agreement,169 the 
2003 Waiver Decision Concerning the Kimberley Process Certi-
fication Scheme for Rough Diamonds (in regard to restrictions 
on trade in diamonds from conflict zones),170 the 2002 Waiver 
Decision exempting LDCs from having to provide exclusive 
marketing rights for any new drugs in the period when they do 
not provide patent protection,171 as well as the 2003 waiver de-
cision for essential medicines in relation to the TRIPS Agree-
ment.  Waiver decisions can be differentiated between those 
that “are granted for concretely defined measures or situa-
tions…to coordinate WTO law with other international legal 
regimes”, and those adopted “to legalize abstractly defined 
                                                                                                                                  
Fourth Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol 
Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/899 (Nov. 27,  2013), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm.  
168
 Id. 
169
 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Novem-
ber 2001, European Communities – the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, 
WT/MIN(01)/15 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_
e.htm. 
170
 See Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/432/Rev.1 (Feb. 24, 2003), 
available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=49791,3681,42337,43438&CurrentCa
talogueIdIndex=0&FullTextSearch=.  
171
  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Ex-
tension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002),  available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art66_1_e.htm. 
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measures for all or groups of members…includ[ing] the 1971 
waivers to legalize preferential tariff treatment by developed 
contracting parties under the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences and among developing countries, which were both suc-
ceeded by the Enabling Clause of 1999…[and] the 1999 waiver 
to enable developing country members to maintain trade pref-
erences for products from least developed countries”, among 
others.172  The 2003 waiver decision on essential medicines is 
one such decision exemplifying compliance with duties of the 
States Parties to the ICESCR to respect, protect, and fulfill 
ICESCR rights, specifically Article 12 of the ICESCR on the 
right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health.  How-
ever, much as securing sufficient political leverage and support 
for the required majority vote would not be easy for approving 
authoritative interpretations or amending provisions of the 
WTO agreements, obtaining a waiver decision as a means for 
realizing ICESCR rights is likewise not always a politically 
feasible option for WTO Members who are States Parties to the 
ICESCR. 
Perhaps an equally, if not more, strategic route for WTO 
Members who are States Parties to the ICESCR to ensure that 
WTO decision-making fully takes into account the realization 
of ICESCR rights would be in wielding the agenda-setting pow-
er in the WTO, where developing countries, and particularly 
emerging powers such as Brazil, India, and China have started 
to take a more active role, especially on food and agriculture 
negotiations.173  The Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 
witnessed political tussles between the United States (which 
preferred to launch a narrow trade agenda at the Seattle Min-
isterial Meeting), and the European Union (which “wanted to 
include a large number of topics including the environment, la-
bor, trade remedies, investment and competition”). Developing 
countries preferred to emphasize “agriculture, trade in manu-
factures and tropical products, implementation issues relating 
to the Uruguay Round agreements, issues related to debt, 
technical assistance and capacity-building, and the reform of 
                                                          
172
 See Feichtner EJIL 2009, supra note 156, at 621. 
173
 See Brendan Vickers, The Role of the BRICS in the WTO:  System-
Supporters or Change Agents in Multilateral Trade?, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 254, 261 (Amrita Narlikar, 
Martin Daunton & Robert M. Stern eds., 2012).  
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the decision-making procedures.”174  The stalled Doha Devel-
opment Agenda reflects increasing tensions in the relationship 
between trade and key aspects of economic, social and cultural 
rights that are intrinsic to development.  The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration affirmed the Members’ commitment to the objec-
tive of sustainable development, stressing the balance between 
trade and social protection in that “the aims of upholding and 
safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral 
trading system, and acting for the protection of the environ-
ment and the promotion of sustainable development can and 
must be mutually supportive…recogniz[ing] that under WTO 
rules no country should be prevented from taking measures for 
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or of 
the environment at the levels it considers appropriate, subject 
to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade, and are otherwise in accord-
ance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements.”175  Areas 
identified under the Work Programme in the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration all involve crucial issues of economic, social and 
cultural rights – from special and differential treatment for de-
veloping countries in agricultural and non-agricultural prod-
ucts; the protection of biodiversity and indigenous knowledge 
and access to essential medicines in relation to the TRIPS 
agreement; obtaining a development-based policy analysis of 
the relationship between trade and investment; technical assis-
tance and transparency with respect to issues involving the in-
teraction of trade and competition policy as well as government 
procurement matters; trade facilitation special needs of devel-
oping country Members and LDC Members; negotiations on the 
relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade ob-
ligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements; 
recommendations on trade, debt, and finance; and targeted 
                                                          
174
 SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO 91 (Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
175
 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, ¶6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#specia
l [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
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technical assistance for LDCs.176  There is no better time for 
WTO Members who are States Parties to the ICESCR to draw 
upon their obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill ICESCR 
rights to inform the content of their negotiations than in the 
present Doha Development Round.177 
As seen in the foregoing subsections, there are segmented 
efforts to achieve “balance” between trade and non-trade public 
policy objectives, the three core functional pillars of the WTO, 
and the counterpart institutions that oversee such functions.  
The following section identifies some dissonance between the 
voices that get to weigh in on these balancing processes, and 
those often excluded from public policy decision-making at the 
WTO. 
II.  THE PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTIONAL DEFICITS AT THE WTO:  
WHO UNDERTAKES ‘BALANCING’? 
WTO rules are contained in around sixty agreements, an-
nexes, decisions, and understandings, mostly negotiated and 
concluded during the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round, which in-
cludes the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, 
and landmark multilateral agreements in trade in goods, trade 
in services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, and gov-
ernment trade policy review.178  These agreements can be cate-
gorized according to:  1) “broad principles” (e.g. the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, and the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights); 2) “extra agreements and 
annexes dealing with the special requirements of specific sec-
tors or issues”; and 3) “detailed and lengthy schedules (or lists) 
of commitments made by individual countries allowing specific 
foreign products or service providers access to their mar-
kets”.179 Apart from the WTO agreements, other sources of 
                                                          
176
 Id.  at ¶ 13-44.   
177
 Andreas Blüthner, Trade and Human Rights at Work: Next Round, 
Please?, in AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO 355 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
178
 See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Overview: A Naviga-
tional Guide, WTO (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm. 
179
 Doha Declaration, supra note 179. 
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WTO law (alternatively dubbed as soft law180) that may “clarify 
or define the law applicable between WTO Members”181 in-
clude:  the WTO dispute settlement reports, the acts of WTO 
bodies, agreements concluded in the context of the WTO, cus-
tomary international law, general principles of law, other in-
ternational agreements, subsequent practice of WTO Members, 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists, and the nego-
tiating history.182  WTO Members accept the multilateral 
agreements in the system as a “single undertaking…justified 
as necessary to prevent the kind of free-riding that was possi-
ble in the disjoint legal order of the pre-Uruguay Round 
GATT.”183  While it remains much debated if this approach in-
deed achieves complete uniformity of WTO rules, it is neverthe-
less acknowledged that the single undertaking approach signif-
icantly contributes towards increasing the consistency of the 
content, scope, and application of these rules within the WTO 
membership.184 
Rule-making occurs from a combination of the processes of 
negotiating treaties at the WTO pursuant to Article III:2 of the 
WTO Agreement/185 Rule-making also occurs from  the ‘second-
                                                          
180
 Mary Footer identifies soft law instruments in the WTO as “the reso-
lutions adopted by the organisation’s institutional bodies.  These include not 
only ministerial declarations and decisions but also the decisions of the vari-
ous councils and committees, which may embody understandings, guidelines, 
notes produced by the WTO Secretariat at the request of the members, 
Chairman’s statements and so on.  While they are not intended to be legally 
binding they may nevertheless have practical effect and may prove legally 
relevant….[soft law in the WTO] has proven to be particularly useful where 
there is broad lack of agreement or a lack of coordination among WTO mem-
bers, where an issue is highly contestable or where cooperation gives rise to 
distributive conflicts.”  See Mary E. Footer, The (Re)turn to ‘Soft Law’ in Rec-
onciling the Antinomies in WTO Law, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 241, 247-48 
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1789830. 
181
 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (Cambridge University Press 
2nd ed. 2008) [hereinafter VAN DEN BOSSCHE]. 
182
See PAUWELYN, supra note 164, at 40-52. 
183
 Nicholas Lamp, Democracy in the WTO – The Limits of the Legitimacy 
Debate, in GLOBAL RISKS: CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD ORDER THROUGH LAW, 
POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS (Janna Hertwig, Sylvia Maus & Peter Lang eds., 
2010). 
184
 See generally Craig VanGrasstek and Pierre Sauve, The Consistency of 
WTO Rules: Can the Single Undertaking Be Squared with Variable Geome-
try?, 9 J. INT. ECON. LAW 837 (2006). 
185
 Thomas Cottier, A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision-Making, in 
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ary legislation’, functional rules, and particularized decisions of 
the WTO political organs issued to implement the covered mul-
tilateral agreements within the WTO system.186  The institu-
tional structure of the WTO and its key political organs is laid 
out in Article IV of the WTO Agreement: the Ministerial Con-
ference (composed of all Member States meeting at least once 
every two years); the General Council, which conducts the day 
to day functions of the Ministerial Conference when the latter 
is not in session, and also acts as the Trade Policy Review Body 
(TPRB) and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); the three sec-
toral councils (Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in 
Services, Council for TRIPS) which oversee the implementation 
of the GATT, GATS, and TRIPS; other specialized councils, 
committees, and groups as created by the Ministerial Confer-
ence (such as the Trade Negotiations committee, Committee on 
Trade and Development, etc.).187  The WTO Secretariat dis-
charges “exclusively international” responsibilities and admin-
istrative duties to implement instructions solely from the 
WTO.188  These political organs of the WTO collectively dis-
charge the WTO’s core functions under Article III of the WTO 
Agreement:189 1) the facilitation of the implementation, admin-
istration, and operation of the WTO Agreement, the multilat-
eral and plurilateral trade agreements; 2) providing the forum 
for negotiations of new agreements among its Members con-
cerning their multilateral trade relations; 3) administer the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); 4) administer the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM); and 5) coordinate 
with other global economic institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and affiliated agencies.   
Apart from these formal political organs, WTO rule-
makers also appear in varied forms.  WTO Member States con-
duct trade negotiations “in a context of flexible, interest-driven 
                                                                                                                                  
REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 42, 49 (Debra P. Steger ed., Wilfrid Laurer University Press 2009), 
available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2010/05075.pdf. 
186
 EC-Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 59, at 51. See also Ar-
min von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a 
Deficient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 609, 625-44 (2001).   
187
 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 28, at art. IV.  
188
 Id. at art. VI.  
189
 See id. at art. III.  
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coalitions.  They may belong to more than one grouping, de-
pending on their interests.”190  Depending on the negotiation 
agenda for a given round,191 formal and informal coalitions 
could be as durable or ephemeral as those for developing coun-
try Members, the least developed country (LDC) Members, the 
European Union and its Member States, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Group of Latin America 
and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC), the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group (ACP), the G-20, and the ‘Quad’ at the Uru-
guay Round (the four largest trading entities – the European 
Communities, the United States, Japan, and Canada), as well 
as those entities with Observer status, such as intergovern-
mental international organizations (the United Nations, the 
World Bank, UNCTAD, among others).192  WTO decisions are 
issued through negative consensus,193 with trade negotiations 
and other key decisions often facilitated through the ‘green 
room’ meetings between major WTO powers and select Mem-
bers whose interests are most implicated in the particular 
meeting.194  In any event, it should be clear that the legislative 
process does not take place in isolation from the executive im-
plementation of WTO rules, as  “the WTO Agreement is not 
meant to institutionalize any autonomous political process.”195 
The WTO also provides for guidelines in its engagement 
with non-governmental organizations, although this is largely 
limited to transparency and public information concerns, since 
the “Members have pointed to the special character of the 
WTO, which is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty 
of rights and obligations among its Members and a forum for 
negotiations. As a result of extensive discussions, there is cur-
rently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for 
                                                          
190
 Cottier, supra note 188, at 46.  
191
 See generally Robert Z. Lawrence, Rulemaking Amidst Growing Di-
versity: A Club-Of-Clubs Approach To WTO Reform and New Issue Selection, 
2004 World Trade Forum, available at  
http://hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawrence/LawrenceClub%20ofClubsFinal.pdf 
(proposing to delineate ‘clubs’ to which WTO members could additionally sub-
scribe based on their interests and the core mission of the WTO). 
192
 VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 184, at 107-09.   
193
 See Jaime Tijmes-lhl, Consensus and majority voting in the WTO, 8 
WORLD TRADE REVIEW 3 (July 2009).  
194
 Lawrence, supra note 194, at 144-49. . 
195
 Bogdandy, supra note 189, at 614. 
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NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its 
meetings.”196  In practice, however, NGOs have been able to 
strategically engage the WTO throughout various areas of 
trade policy-making and agenda-setting.197  Since the inception 
of the WTO Guidelines, NGOs have been able to observe plena-
ry sessions and ministerial conferences, obtain information on 
trade issues, and strategically push their particular advocacies 
on WTO member States, such as those on enforcing labor 
rights, protecting the right to health and enabling access to es-
sential medicines through compulsory licensing as an exception 
to TRIPS obligations.198  To the extent that NGOs have been 
able to incrementally influence the content of interpretations of 
WTO norms thus far, they are still regarded as marginal play-
ers in WTO rulemaking.199 
Despite the robust profusion of WTO rulemaking and 
sources of rules, it is noteworthy in the design and nature of 
rulemaking at the WTO that there are institutionalized oppor-
tunities for the centralized creation and interpretation of WTO 
rules. The General Council – the highest political decision-
making body of the WTO – also assumes other functions that 
critically bear upon WTO rulemaking.  When it acts as the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), it can review trade 
                                                          
196
 General Council Decision, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations 
with Non-Governmental Organizations, ¶ VI , WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm. 
197
 Seema Sapra, The WTO System of Trade Governance:  The Stale NGO 
Debate and the Appropriate Role for Non-State Actors, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71, 
105 (2009) (“… NGOs already play an important role informally and have a 
significant agenda-setting impact … [n]ow that NGOs are already actively 
involved in trade negotiations, the more important question might no longer 
be whether NGOs should participate, but what influence do NGOs have and 
how is it being exercised.”); Julio A. Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate 
and Participation by NGOs in the WTO:  A WTO Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 683, 683-86 (2004); JL Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participa-
tion at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 433, 433-53 (1998); Steve Charnovitz, 
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organi-
zation, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 340-47 (1996); Daniel C. Esty, Non-
Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization:  Cooperation, 
Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 123, 123-34 (1998). 
198
 See Shamima Ahmed, Impact of NGOs on International Organiza-
tions:  Complexities and Considerations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L.817, 827-28 
(2010-2011). 
199
 See Peter van den Bossche, NGO Involvement at the WTO:  A Com-
parative Perspective, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 717, 717-49 (2008). 
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policies and domestic regulations of the WTO Members for con-
sistency with WTO rules.200 The General Council also wears an 
adjudicative hat when it acts as the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) in adopting reports of dispute settlement panels and the 
Appellate Body.201  The DSB does not only adopt panel and Ap-
pellate Body reports, but is also tasked to maintain surveil-
lance of the implementation of rulings and recommendations, 
authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations un-
der the WTO covered agreements, and to inform the relevant 
WTO Councils and Committees of related developments arising 
from disputes under the WTO covered agreements.202 As an 
acknowledged “political institution”,203 the DSB has an envia-
ble record on enforcing compliance with WTO dispute settle-
ment rulings.204 While the legislative process at the WTO pri-
marily occurs through Member States’ trade negotiations, other 
sources of rules (such as Ministerial Conference and/or the 
General Council decisions, standards set by designated tech-
nical bodies or agencies in the WTO covered agreements) may 
thus also involve rule-makers beyond the primary political or-
gans of the WTO.205  The WTO system appears conducive to 
harmonization largely because the common political institu-
tions –the Ministerial Conference and the General Council – 
retain authority to issue decisions on the authoritative inter-
pretation of the WTO covered agreements.  This does not nec-
essarily mean, however, that there is any focused, systematic, 
or dedicated parliamentary oversight process over WTO rule-
making.206 The system does not encapsulate a perfect closed 
                                                          
200
 Pieter Jan Kuijper, Some Institutional Issues Presently Before the 
WTO, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  ESSAYS IN 
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 Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Rulings:  The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 397-
403 (2007). 
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 See Marion Jansen, Defining the Borders of the WTO Agenda, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 161, 167 (Amrita 
Narlikar, Martin Daunton & Robert M. Stern eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
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version of legislation under classic separation of powers theo-
ry.207  Rather, the doctrine of delegation208 in the modern regu-
latory state should appear to be more applicable in assessing 
how institutional, formal, and informal rule-makers at the 
WTO deploy their authority, based on the consent of States to 
the WTO covered agreements.  The application of this doctrine 
as a basis for assessing public authority at the WTO would, 
perhaps, be appropriate when one considers the ‘constitutional-
izing’ consequences of the WTO covered agreements on the ‘in-
ternational legislative process’ on trade, and its concomitant 
impacts on domestic law-making.209 
While States author the treaty standards and norms gov-
erning global trade, in practice, the implementation of these 
standards also trigger considerable rulemaking by other politi-
cal institutions, such as, for trade law, the WTO General Coun-
cil and Ministerial Conference, the sectoral Councils, the uni-
verse of standard-setting agencies and technical bodies 
involved in the SPS, TBT, TRIPS, GATT, GATS, Agriculture, 
and other WTO covered agreements.210  The same functional 
                                                                                                                                  
(2004). 
207
 Under separation of powers “the legislative power includes the power, 
through the enactment of laws, to specify the ends and means of public poli-
cy, but it does not include the executive power to administer and enforce 
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reasons for delegation – the need for agency expertise; the lack 
of time and resources for States to directly undertake, monitor, 
and coordinate rulemaking; as well as the value of removing 
implementation decisions from more political forums –211 may 
also be applied to explain the proliferation of rule-makers and 
rule-making beyond States’ formulation of treaty standards in 
the world trade system.  To the extent that non-delegation doc-
trine also makes itself amenable to critiques of public partici-
pation in the regulatory process,212 and also is subject to some 
form of judicial review,213 one can also test the legitimacy of 
trade rulemaking.  In any event, the fundamental public policy 
institutional deficits at the WTO demonstrably arise from a 
lack of institutional coordination across the three functional 
pillars on how to approach WTO Members’ trade and non-trade 
public policy objectives.  Members have the foremost voice at 
the WTO but not all Members are heard equally in the real cor-
ridors of power and decision-making at the WTO.214  Balancing 
trade and non-trade public policy objectives require complex in-
formational interfaces from the widest possible sources – gov-
ernmental, non-governmental, international, and local – and 
yet there is no well-established and cohesive method yet estab-
lished by the WTO Secretariat to systemically consult all 
stakeholders that may be concerned with respect to different 
environmental, social, labor, cultural, and developmental pub-
lic policies.215  Institutional coordination of Members’ trade and 
non-trade public policy objectives cannot be achieved without 
establishing the necessary information architecture to elicit 
relevant information from the WTO Membership, international 
                                                                                                                                  
gionalism and Multilateralism:  Towards Multilevel Trade Governance, in 
MULTILATERALISM, REGIONALISM, AND BILATERALISM IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
59, 64-65 (Philippe De Lombaerde ed., Springer 2007).  
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 KELSEN, supra note 211, at 673. 
212
 Id. at 680. 
213
 Id. at 682. 
214
 See JOHN WARREN HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR 251 
(Brill, 2008); Yong-Shik Lee, World Trade Organization and Developing 
Countries:  Reform Proposal, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 105, 108-11 (Yong-Shik Lee, Gary Horlick, Won-
Mog Choi, & Tomer Broude eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
215
 See CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS IN 
WTO LAW:  INTERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOALS 471-72 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2011). 
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specialized agencies at the United Nations, non-governmental 
organizations, citizens, groups and other constituencies that 
are ordinarily consulted in a public policy and regulatory man-
agement process.216 
CONCLUSION:  ACTUALIZING THE ‘PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION 
AND COORDINATION’  - THE WTO AS THE FORUM FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY 
India’s failure to ratify the Protocol to the TFA signals the 
most significant tipping point in the stalled Doha Round on the 
tensions on Members’ expectations of flexibility from WTO 
commitments for non-trade public policy commitments.  Lack of 
institutional coordination on the ongoing dialogue and decision-
making in the standard-setting, trade policy review, and dis-
pute settlement functional pillars of the WTO comes at the 
price of abrupt ‘defections’ from WTO compliance by those who 
perceive that the WTO is an inappropriate (if not paralyzed) fo-
rum for balancing trade and non-trade public policy objectives.  
As a World Bank publication presciently observed: 
“Perceptions of inequities in the WTO decision-making system 
implicitly call into question other facets of governance, specifical-
ly, the failure to balance the costs and benefits arising from trade 
negotiations. The end result has been an absence of ‘ownership’ of 
many agreements, and a general suspicion of the WTO…To be 
sure, the WTO is not an international organization intended to 
‘govern’ the global economy, or even international trade relations, 
as a whole.  It does, however, perform some functions of govern-
ance at the international level by providing a forum for trade 
rule-making (legislative function); protecting trade opportunities; 
fostering transparency in the trading system; and enforcing rules 
through a dispute settlement system (judicial function).  In addi-
tion, there are other functions not attributed formally to the 
WTO that are subject to an intense international debate as to 
whether they should be put under its purview.  Examples include 
the supply of international public goods and the subjection of 
                                                          
216
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(Donna Lee & Rorden Wilkinson eds., Routledge 2013). 
62http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/3
3. DIANE DESIERTO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2015  4:41 PM 
2015] BALANCING NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY 611 
markets to social objectives.  Given the scope of the recent ques-
tioning on WTO governance, efforts to pursue new trade negotia-
tions on a comprehensive basis will probably have to go hand in 
hand with a streamlining of the decision-making process that 
pays due attention to the requirements of efficiency and legitima-
cy.  Unless these worries are addressed, new negotiations will 
add to the frustration.”217 
The international law principle of cooperation218 – often 
applied in circumstances involving States’ common interests in 
managing shared resources and mitigating environmental risks 
– is especially significant to the process of balancing trade and 
non-trade public policies.  Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement 
imposes the duty upon WTO Members to bring their national 
laws into conformity with WTO law, but, as seen in Parts II 
and III, the substance of such WTO law insofar as trade and 
non-trade policies is hardly made up of bright-line rules.  If 
WTO Members are expected to harmonize domestic regulatory 
measures with WTO law as a matter of international obliga-
tion, then the balancing process for trade and non-trade public 
policies must itself be transparently and consistently under-
taken in all three of the WTO’s functional pillars – dispute set-
tlement, trade policy review, and trade negotiations – to feasi-
bly enable WTO Members to substantiate and internalize 
conformity with WTO law in their respective public policy 
management processes.  In order to achieve optimal coopera-
tion within the WTO system to arrive at the sustainable policy 
flexibility originally envisaged in the Preamble to the Marra-
kesh Agreement and the numerous public policy calibration 
provisions in the WTO agreements, institutional coordination 
premised on equal informational access and contribution by 
Members and other public policy stakeholders will be critical.  
Coordination and cooperation should be embraced as funda-
mental and foundational principles WTO law, stemming from 
the teleological purpose and original design towards balancing 
trade and non-trade public policy objectives that were built into 
                                                          
217
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HANDBOOK (Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo & Philip English eds., World 
Bank 2002). 
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the WTO agreements themselves through the public policy cal-
ibration provisions, and the assumption of legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial functions dispersed across WTO organs. The 
crystal lesson from India’s refusal to ratify the Protocol to the 
TFA and around fourteen years of stalled negotiations at the 
Doha Development Round is that balance between trade and 
non-trade public policy objectives – the development dimension 
avowed in the WTO – is the ultimate object and purpose of the 
WTO Agreements.219 The piecemeal, dispersed, and incremen-
tal approach to the balancing process thus far comes at a high 
price for the entire WTO system, its participants, and the en-
visaged beneficiaries of global multilateral trade.  As percep-
tions of illegitimacy remain unaddressed in the WTO, we risk 
dooming the WTO to irrelevance.  
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